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Notes
Deregulation of the Practice of Law:
Panacea or Placebo?
by
MEREDITH ANN MuNo*
A strong and vocal movement is growing to deregulate the legal
profession by lifting restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law,
enabling any lay practitioner to provide legal services.' Exhortations
to "dismantle the legal monopoly!" 2 and "relinquish the barricades" 3
are published in newspapers and legal publications. This drive stems
from the high costs of legal services and the resulting inaccessibility
of the legal system. Public legal service programs and private pro
bono efforts are not satisfying the need for legal services; roughly
eighty-five percent of those who desire legal help are not receiving
it.4
In California, lay entrepreneurs" cater to this demand for legal
services by offering the public everything from do-it-yourself divorce
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1988, Rice University. The author would like to
thank her father for teaching her the ideals of law and the realities of the processes of the
law.
1. Legal commentators urging some level of deregulation include: C. WOLFRAM, MOD-
ERN LEGAL ETmics 830-32 (1986) (generally advocating deregulation); Christensen, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even
Good Sense? 1980 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 159, 214-15 (proposing abolition of the exclusive
right of lawyers to practice law and retention only of the rights of lawyers to use the title
"lawyer" and to present cases in court); Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized Practice of
Law: Some New Ways of Looking at an Old Question, 4 NovA L.J. 363, 376 (1980)
(advocating deregulation of a certain amount of law determined to be acceptable by an
independent agency's balancing of interests between lawyers, lawyers' "competitors," and
consumers); Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STA. L. REv. 1, 94-96 (1981) (favoring
a number of variations based on limited deregulation); Note, On Letting the Laity Litigate:
ThePetition Clause and Unauthorized Practice Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1515, 1541-45
(1984) (proposing a plan that would provide for voluntary certification while still allowing
those persons who do not wish to become certified to practice law unprohibited).
2. Bandow, Business Forum: Assaulting the Barriers to Legal Practice; A Brazen
System of Self-Enrichment, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1987, at 2, col. 3 (city ed.). See also
Sylvester, The People vs. Lawyers; More Groups Cash in on the Hatred of Attorneys, Nat'l
L.J., Jan. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
3. Rhode, supra note 1, at 99.
4. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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kits to form-filling services. 5 But these lay practitioners operate in
legal limbo. They may be violating California law, which prohibits
the unauthorized practice of law, 6 but the California Bar (Bar) is not
actively seeking their prosecution. 7 Critics of the Bar's "monopoly" 8
of the practice of law point to the commercial successes of lay prac-
titioners as proof that not all legal problems require the services of
a lawyer. 9 These critics reject the traditional argument that lay prac-
5. The number of persons registered with the National Association of Independent
Paralegals, an association of lay practitioners, rose from 237 in 1985 to 21,141 in 1989;
roughly half were in California alone. Shao, Perry Mason They're Not, Bus. WK., Nov.
20, 1989, at 83. The 1989 Pacific Bell Directory (San Francisco, 1989-90) has well over 30
different listings of individuals or groups under "Divorce Assistance," "Legal Clinics,"
"Paralegals," and "Legal Forms." The 1990-91 Pacific Bell Directory for Greater Los
Angeles has more than 50 listings under the same headings. Although some of these listings
offer services in conjunction with attorney supervision, a majority appear to operate solo.
Numerous well-known publishers also offer self-help legal manuals. HALT (Help Abolish
Legal Tyranny), a Washington, D.C. organization founded in 1978, publishes self-help
guides and also lobbies for legal reform such as deregulation. Silas, Stop to HALT?
Unlicensed Practice Alleged, 71 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at 21; Silas, HALT Probe Over: Self-
Help Legal Guides OK, 72 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1986, at 18 (Dallas subcommittee of the Texas
Supreme Court dropped its unauthorized practice of law investigation of HALT). Nolo
Press, a California publisher, publishes a wide variety of self-help legal books. Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 1. See, e.g., N. DACEY, How To AvOID PROBATE (1965) (a Crown
Publishers, Inc., publication that provides forms and instructions on drafting wills and
trusts).
6. It is a misdemeanor and contempt of court to advertise or otherwise represent
oneself as a lawyer or to practice law in California without being an active member of the
California Bar. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125-6127 (West 1990). Likewise, a member of
the California Bar may not aid any person or entity in the unauthorized practice of law or
practice law in a jurisdiction outside California where to do so would violate that jurisdic-
tion's regulations. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-300 (1989). A lawyer,
however, is not prohibited from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating
functions to them so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains respon-
sibility for the work. A lawyer also is not prohibited from providing professional advice
and instruction to non-lawyers such as claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial
institutions, social workers, accountants, and persons employed in government agencies
whose employment requires knowledge of the law, or counseling non-lawyers who wish to
proceed pro se. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 comment (1989).
This Note focuses on the unauthorized practice of law by lay practitioners, however, and
does not discuss the unauthorized practice of law by lawyers.
7. Independent paralegals have been operating under little threat of prosecution in
California for almost twenty years. Hall, Bar Committee on Legal Technicians Gets Fast
Deadline, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 24, 1989, at 9, col. 1. See infra notes 37-40, 47-49, 95, and
accompanying text.
8. The Bar's control over the practice of law actually resembles a trade association or
cartel, not a monopoly. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 4 n.7.
9. "The commercial success of divorce kits and similar nonlawyer intrusions suggests
that clients both find lawyer charges in the area unjustifiably high and believe that having
two highly trained and qualified lawyers on each side of a dissolution proceeding is a serious
squandering of educational, legal and economic resources." C. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at
828-29. See also Engel, The Standardization of Lawyers' Services, 1977 Am. B. FOUND. REs.
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titioners, not bound by the educational and ethical restraints that
bind lawyers, pose a risk to the public of incompetence or fraud.'0
Even those critics who do concede some threat of fraud or incom-
petence by lay practitioners argue that the public should be given the
opportunity to weigh these risks with the possible cost benefits in a
free-market setting."
In 1987, the California Bar created the Public Protection Com-
mittee (Committee) to help identify areas where lay practitioners could
effectively provide legal services.' 2 After conducting public'hearings
and surveying California consumer protection agencies and other
states' bars, the Committee recommended abolishing the prohibition
of the lay practice of law. The Committee's proposal essentially would
allow persons to practice law without meeting educational require-
ments or following ethical restraints. Lay practitioners would be re-
quired only to register with a state agency. California would be the
first state to adopt such a radical deregulation of the legal system. 3
J. 817, 840 ("lay specialists have participated with great success, attracting a high enough
volume of business to justify their standardized operations and thereby undercutting their
lawyer-competitors").
10. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 152.
12. OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANARDS, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF THE
PUBLIC PROTECTION COMM. (1989) (distributed for public comment Dec. 1989, available from
the California State Bar Office of Professional Standards) [hereinafter REPORT I].
Recently, Senator Robert Presley and Assemblywoman Delaine Eastin have sponsored
identical bills, drafted by HALT, that essentially mirror the Committee's proposal. See
Preprint Senate Bill No. 9 (1990); Preprint Assembly Bill No. 14 (1990) [hereinafter
Deregulation Bill] (both bills are available at the California State Bar Office'of Professional
Standards).
The Bar's second committee group, the Commission on Legal Technicians, discussed in
Part III. D., also recently introduced a pioposal supporting the proposal of this Note in
many respects. See REPORT OF Tng STATE BAR OF CAI FORNIA COMIUSSION ON LEGAL
TEcmcucs, (1990) [hereinafter REPORT II] (available at the California State Bar Office of
Professional Standards). See Part III. D. for the status of REPORT II with respect to the
Bar, legislature, and courts.
13. All states prohibit the unauthorized practice of law, but there is no consensus on
what in fact constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. To date, only one state, Wash-
ington, defines the unauthorized practice of law to exempt a very limited form of practice
by lay practitioners. On January 1, 1983, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted Rule
12 of the Admission to Practice Rules, which authorizes "Limited Practice Officers" to
select, prepare, and complete standard forms incident to the closing of limited real estate
and property transactions. WASH. CT. A.P.R. 12(a), (d) (1983). The forms are pre-approved
by a board, which consists of lawyers and "business representatives," id. 12(b)(2)(vii), and
the officers may not give "legal advice." Id. 12(g)(4). The officers must pass an examination,
Rules for Admission & Certification to Limited Practice Under APR 12, 12(b)(ii), complete
continuing education, id. 15, and follow disciplinary rules, Disciplinary Rules for Limited
Practice Officers 1.1.
In Illinois, a bill (introduced on June 8, 1990 by Senator Emil Jones) is pending that
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To fully understand the impact such deregulation would have
on the California legal system, one first must appreciate the rules
currently governing the unauthorized practice of law. Part I of this
Note examines the current California unauthorized practice of law
rules. 14 Part II discusses the inefficiencies of the legal system, fo-
cusing on the poor and middle classes' lack of adequate access to
legal help and the profession's failure to address these problems fully.
This Part also presents deregulation proposals claiming to correct
these deficiencies. 5 Part III delineates the Committee's research,
findings, and proposal to deregulate. Part IV-analyzes the Com-
mittee's proposal.
This Note concludes, in Part V, that existing unauthorized prac-
tice of law rules are insupportable to the extent that the rules do not
recognize that some types of legal services are sufficiently standard-
ized to enable lay practitioners to perform them competently. Full
deregulation is not the best solution, however, because deregulation
would allow lay practitioners to represent individuals at administrative hearings and at real
estate closings, and to draft wills and trusts. Independent Paralegal Licensing Act, Bill No.
2314. The bill sets forth educational and ethical requirements. Id.
A bill that would have allowed licensed lay practitioners to perform substantive legal work
"customarily, but not exclusively performed by an attorney" was defeated in Maryland.
House Bill No. 1029, House of Delegates (Feb. 5, 1988). Another bill, sponsored by the
Committee on the Judiciary, that would have allowed lay practitioners to fill out legal forms
in divorce, bankruptcy, real estate, and adoption matters, never went past the committee
stage in Oregon. Suskin, "Excerpt from 'An Overview of Recent Development in Various
States with Respect to the Utilization of Legal Assistants,"' reprinted in REPORT II, supra
note 12, at Supp., Appendix 3.
14. The history of the unauthorized practice of law is beyond the scope of this Note;
for a comprehensive coverage of this history, see Christensen, supra note 1, at 161-201.
15. Numerous proposals suggest altering the existing legal structure to increase access
to legal services. This Note only examines proposals by the deregulation faction, see supra
note 1, and the Committee. Examples of other proposals include: B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS
FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 49-53 (1970) (suggesting supportive non-lawyer personnel
who would work dependently or independently of lawyers); Michelman, Guiding the Invisible
Hand: The Consumer Protection Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation, 12 PEPPER-
DINE L. REV. 1, 22 (1984) (suggesting reducing legal costs through the use of legal clinics
and other types of mass marketing methods such as specialization, systems management
techniques, increased use of paralegals, and substitution of various forms of capital for
labor-all of which would reduce attorney time per matter and reduce the cost of shifting
areas of expertise); Nielsen, Legalizing Nonlawyer Proprietorship in the Legal Clinic Industry:
Reform in the Public Interest, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 625, 662-63 (1981) (advocating nonlawyer
ownership of proprietary or management interests in legal-services organizations); Saltzman,
Private Bar Delivery of Civil Legal Services to the Poor: A Design For a Combined Private
Attorney and Staffed Office Delivery System, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1165, 1176-79 (1983)
(suggesting a combined staffed office and a private bar delivery system for civil legal services
for the poor); Selinger, Functional Division of the American Legal Profession: The Legal
Paraprofessional, 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22, 29-36 (1969) (advocating a system analogous to
the medical profession-fully trained legal technicians would be permitted to perform limited
services only upon the "prescription" of a lawyer).
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also fails to differentiate between the types of legal services lay prac-
titioners can perform competently and those that are best left to
trained attorneys. Deregulation advocates underestimate the actual
and potential harm caused by lay practitioners and ignore certain
market realities that render the practice of law unsuitable for a free
market system. Some legal needs cannot and should not be valued
in terms of dollars and cents. Those who lack the financial or ed-
ucational resources to use the legal market effectively to distinguish
between incompetence and competence, illegitimacy and legitimacy,
cannot benefit from this open market and even may be harmed by
it. Rather, this Note argues for a licensing system that would allow
lay practitioners to provide certain standardized legal activities under
protective yet unrestrictive guidelines. Limited licensing would both
increase supply and lower the cost of legal services while still pro-
viding some protection from incompetence and fraud.
I. Current Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules
This Part describes the traditional justifications posited by the
California Legislature and courts for the unauthorized practice of
law rules, namely protection of the individual consumer and of the
judicial system. Notably, neither rationale differentiates between types
of legal services. Both therefore ignore the possibility that one may
gain expertise in certain standardizable legal services through ex-
perience rather than formal education. These rationales assume that
lay practitioners would perform less efficiently and produce a sub-
stantively lower quality service than fully trained lawyers. The Part
then outlines how the coordinate branches of California government
have grappled with the problems inherent in regulating such a prev-
alent and thus somewhat undefinable part of our lives. The resulting
confused body of jurisprudence has created a gap between the law
and its enforcement, which ultimately defeats the justifications for
creating the unauthorized practice of law rules.
A. Justification for the Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules
Crucial to an analysis of the rules regulating the unauthorized
practice of law in California is the justification behind these rules:
traditionally asserted by the courts and legislature as being the pro-
tection of both the public and the judicial system.
The primary motivation for California's unauthorized practice
of law rules is the protection of the public from lay practitioners who
November 1990] LAY PRACTITIONERS
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are not subject to educational and ethical restraints. 6 From this
premise it is argued that because lay practitioners are not required
to fulfill any educational requirements or pass competency exami-
nations, they potentially are unable to steer clients through unfa-
miliar and complex matters of substantive and procedural law. ' 7 Even
practitioners such as real estate brokers and accountants with greater
legal expertise in their fields than lawyers may injure their clients by
failing to recognize and guard against the legal ramifications of areas
of law outside their particular specialties. 8
The "lack of ethics" argument, distilled to its simplest form,
is that legal services should be performed only by those subject to
the Bar's and courts' supervision and standards of confidentiality,
16. The California Supreme Court asserted that "'[t]he profession . . . of the law ...
is essentially and more largely a matter of public interest and concern. . . . [Society has an]
interest [in being] . . . safeguarded against the ignorances or evil dispositions of those who
may be masquerading beneath the cloak of the legal and supposedly learned and upright
profession."' Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 535, 540, 469 P.2d 353, 356, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 673, 676 (1970). The California legislature also has explained that the purpose of the
unauthorized practice of law rules is to protect the public. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1-100(A) (West 1989). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 1-2 (1981) ("The public should be protected from those who are not qualified to be
lawyers by reason of a deficiency in education or moral standards or of other relevant
factors but who nevertheless seek to practice law."). See infra note 150 for the educational
requirements to become a member of the California Bar.
17. The quality of legal advice and draftsmanship depends not only on legal
knowledge, analysis, and expression skills, possessed more generally by lawyers
than others, but also on the ability to recognize relevant legal issues. The possible
relevance of areas of law may not be recognized or understood by even competent
non-lawyers who are knowledgeable in other fields of law. As in the practice of
medicine, the original diagnosis of a legal problem may be the most critical
element. Probably, more legal rights are lost through ignorance of their existence
than through sloppy advocacy to achieve their enforcement. Many lawyers claim
that they make more money trying to rectify the mistakes made by laypersons
who initially represent themselves or others than they lose by not being consulted
in the first instance. Furthermore, since an initial mistake may extinguish legal
rights, failure to consult qualified legal counsel may cause irreparable harm.
Accordingly, the unauthorized practice laws should continue to have force both
within and beyond the courtroom.
Weckstein, Limitations on the Right to Counsel: The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 1978
UTAH L. REv. 649, 675.
18. In Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619, 626 (1954), the
court, in determining whether an accountant had engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law, stated:
The interest of the public is not protected by the narrow specialization of an
individual who lacks the perspective and the orientation which comes only from
a thorough knowledge and understanding of basic legal concepts, of legal processes,
and of the interrelation of the law in all its branches.
See also, Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 174 (1967); Weckstein,
supra note 17, at 650-51.
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undivided client loyalty, and moral integrity. 19 For example, a lay
practitioner is not subject to prohibitions against mishandling client
funds, charging exorbitant fees, engaging in improper solicitation or
misleading advertising, disclosing client secrets, or withholding client
documents .20
Proponents of the protection of the judicial system rationale
argue that the quality of the administration of justice, both pro-
cedurally and substantively, is a public good. 21 This rationale builds
on the preceding assumption that due to their freedom from state
bar regulation, lay practitioners are less competent and less ethical
than fully-trained lawyers. This argument then focuses on the effect
that lay practitioners have on society as a whole. 22 On a procedural
level, because lay practitioners are more apt to bring frivolous suits
19. To become an active member of the California Bar, an applicant must be of "good
moral character." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060 (West 1990). The Code, however, does
not define "good moral character."
To determine whether she has the requisite "good moral character," the Bar requires an
applicant to complete a personal history questionnaire, which asks whether the applicant
has been convicted of violating a law or ordinance or has been involved in a law suit or
disciplinary action. THE STATE BAR RULE IN PROFESSIONAL Acrnvrrms 4 (A News Background
by the Office of Bar Communications and Public Affairs of the State Bar of California)
(Sept. 1982) [hereinafter News Background]. If the Committee of Bar Examiners determines
that either the applicant's answers on the questionnaire or any other investigation findings
warrant her possible disqualification from Bar membership, the State Bar court may hold
a hearing. Id. at 5. If the Bar court determines the applicant lacks the requisite character,
the Committee may refuse to recommend her to the California Supreme Court. Id. The
applicant may have the California Supreme Court review the Committee's finding before
making its decision. Id. The California Supreme Court makes the final decision. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6064 (West 1990).
Once an applicant gains acceptance to the Bar, her moral character still is under the
scrutiny of the Bar. Both the California State Bar Act and the California Rules of
Professional Conduct delineate, inter alia, ethical standards that bind members. Unlike a
violation of the State Bar Act, a violation of the California Rules of Professional Conduct
does not give rise automatically to a civil cause of action. See Noble v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 658-59, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-72 (1973). Generally, a member
is subject to disbarment or suspension for the conviction or commission of any act involving
"moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption" whether the act constitutes a misdemeanor or
felony. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6101, 6106 (West 1990). If warranted, a Bar committee
may even order a member to be examined by one or more physicians or psychiatrists it
designates. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6053 (West 1990).
20. In contrast, a lawyer expressly is prohibited from commingling client funds, charging
an illegal or unconscionable fee, or retaining property whether or not the client has paid.
CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 4-100, 4-200, 3-700 (1989). Nor may a lawyer
disclose client secrets or engage in false or misleading advertising. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ "6068, 6152 (West 1990).
21. Michelman, supra note 15, at 15.
22. The legal rules themselves reflect this concern for the larger effect. One purpose of
the legal rules is "to promote respect and confidence in the legal profession:" CAL. RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-100 (West 1989).
LAY PRACTITIONERSNovember 1990] -
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or deal inefficiently with legitimate claims, society is indirectly harmed
by the resultant creation of congested courts and higher court fees. 23
On a substantive level, because lay practitioners are more apt to fos-
ter incorrect or non-optimal legal outcomes, the high standards in-
herently desired in our legal, "moral" society are lowered. 24
The postulates that lay practitioners will harm the public and
the system of justice because these practitioners lack external con-
straints have resulted in a body of jurisprudence purporting to reg-
ulate the practice of law. As the next section will emphasize, an uneasy
and often broken alliance between the legal community and the lay
community has been created: lay practitioners may perform only cler-
ical-type services.
B. California's Regulation of the Practice of Law
Three sources of jurisprudence bind those who seek to practice
law in California: applicable law including the State Bar Act, 25 hold-
ings of the California courts, 26 and California Bar rules and regu-
lations .27
Under the State Bar Act, an individual who advertises or holds
herself out as a lawyer, or practices law without being an active mem-
ber of the Bar is guilty of a misdemeanor and contempt of court. 2
The Bar acts as an arm of the judiciary by investigating complaints
regarding unauthorized practice of law and then recommending dis-
cipline to the judiciary. 29 Anyone from "displaced" attorneys to de-
frauded customers may file complaints of unauthorized practice of
23. "[C]heaper and lower quality services delivered by personnel governed neither by
the rules of the courts nor by fidelity to the values of the legal system would . . . reduce
the efficiency and increase the social cost of the administration of justice." Michelman,
supra note 15, at 21 n.75. See infra note 151.
24. "Access to the courts is not just another social or welfare benefit, but an issue
that goes to the moral tone of a society and the legitimacy of its institutions. Belief in the
priority of the rule of law is a view not confined to lawyers." Cramton, Why Legal Services
for the Poor? 68 A.B.A. J. 550, 553 (1982).
25. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6100-6117 (West 1990). The legislature may exercise a
"reasonable degree" of control over the practice of law under the state police power. State
Bar of Cal. v. Superior Ct., 207 Cal. 323, 331, 278 P. 432, 439 (1929).
26. The judicial power of California is vested in the courts as the legislature deems
necessary. CAt. CONST. art. VI, § 1. The courts' power to regulate the practice of law is
among the inherent powers of article VI. People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 143, 150 (1850).
27. The California Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the Board of
Governors of the State Bar of California and approved by the California Supreme Court
on November 28, 1988, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code sections 6076
and 6077. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-100 (West 1989).
28. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6126-6127 (West 1990).
29. News Background, supra note 19, at 30.
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law.30 The Bar may initiate and conduct investigations or delegate
the duty to state prosecutors with or without the filing or presen-
tation of a complaint. 31 The Bar has the power to hear and try all
matters, including the power to take and hear evidence, administer
oaths and affirmations, and subpoena documents and persons. 32 The
Bar only may give suggestions, however, because the judiciary ex-
ercises independent judgment both with regard to the weight and
sufficiency of evidence and with regard to discipline. 33
The bite of the unauthorized practice of law rules depends on
the definition of the practice of law, which the State Bar Act leaves
open. California courts have defined the practice of law broadly:
the doing or performing [of] services in a court of justice in any
matter depending therein, throughout its various stages ... in-
clud[ing] legal advice and counsel and the preparation of legal in-
struments and contracts by which legal rights are secured although
such matter may or may not be pending in court.34
For close cases35 an even broader interpretation has been used: a per-
son is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law "if difficult or
doubtful legal questions are involved which, to safeguard the public,
reasonably demand the application of a trained legal mind." '36
30. Of course a customer claiming injury from a lay practitioner can attempt to sue
without the Bar's help under a theory of contract or tort. But see infra notes 178-188 and
accompanying text (suggesting the difficulty in bringing a claim of this kind absent actual
intentional misrepresentation by the lay practitioner that she is a licensed member of the
Bar).
31. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6044 (West 1990).
32. Id. § 6049.
33. Goldstein v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 937, 766 P.2d 560, 254 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1989)
reh'g denied; Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 300-301, 368 P.2d 697, 699, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 160 (1962).
34. People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 535, 209 P. 363, 365 (1922)
(quoting Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 529, 34 N.E. 836, 837 (1893)).
35. The court in Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954),
acknowledged that whether a particular action constitutes the practice of law is a "question
of considerable difficulty," id. at 812, 273 P.2d at 623, but stated that the close cases arise
"when the service furnished is incidental to the performance of other services of a non legal
character in the pursuit of another calling such as that of accounting." Id. at 817, 273 P.2d
at 626. The court further explained that a "difficult or doubtful question of law is not to
be measured by the comprehension of a trained legal mind, but by the understanding thereof
which is possessed by a reasonably intelligent layman who is reasonably familiar with the
similar transactions." Id.
36. Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 535, 543, 469 P.2d 353, 358, 86 Cal. Rptr.
673, 678 (1970) (quoting Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App.- 2d Supp. at 818, 273 P. 2d at
626 (1954)). This latter definition was used recently in McKay v. Longsworth, 211 Cal. App.
3d 1592, 260 Cal. Rptr. 250, reh'g denied (1989).
Other state courts generally agree with California courts that the sale of legal forms
without personalized instructions or advice does not constitute the unauthorized practice of
law. See, e.g., Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Or. 552, 538 P.2d 913 (1975) (holding
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While this arguably all-encompassing and circuitous definition
could render any lay practice of law illegal, the California courts have
accepted a certain degree of lay involvement. In the few published
cases involving the practice of law by lay practitioners, the courts
have upheld the performance of clerical services such as furnishing
and filling out legal forms.37 Lay practitioners are not allowed, how-
ever, to provide advice or personalized instructions with these forms.3 8
Ethics opinions of the California State Bar39 support the courts' in-
that merely providing legal forms without offering personal advice or other assistance does
not constitute the unauthorized practice of law); Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d. 683
(1974) (publication of a "divorce kit" which included explanations, instructions, and advice
regarding the application and use of forms to secure a no-fault dissolution of marriage
constituted the unauthorized practice of law). The definition of advice in this context
includes a lay practitioner's correction of errors and explanation of which forms are
necessary, how to prepare them, and where to file them. See, e.g., State Bar v. Cramer,
399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W.2d 1 (1976) (non-attorney found to be engaging in unauthorized
practice of law by advising clients on documents necessary for no-fault divorce, preparing
and occasionally filing completed forms with the court, and advising clients as to proper
testimony). Courts are divided whether "kits"-legal forms plus detailed instructions-
violate the rules. Compare New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694,
695, 234 N.E.2d 459, 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423 (1967) (kits do not necessarily violate
practice of law rules) with Florida Bar v. American Legal & Business Forms, Inc., 274 So.
2d 225, 228 (1973) (kits violate practice of law rules); Palmer v. Unauthorized Practice
Comm. of State Bar, 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1969) (defendant engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law by marketing "will forms" that include explanatory instructions). For a
wider coverage of states' unauthorized practice of law regulations, see C. WOLFRAM, supra
note 1, at 834-46; 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law §§ 101-117 (1980 & Supp. 1990);
Annotation, Sale of Books or Forms Designed to Enable Laymen to Achieve Legal Results
Without Assistance of Attorney as Unauthorized Practice of Law, 71 A.L.R. 3D 1000 (1976
& Supp. 1989).
37. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 79 Bankr. 482 (S.D. Cal. 1987):
If defendant had only been called upon to perform and had only undertaken to
perform the clerical service of filling in the blanks on a particular form in
accordance with information furnished him by the parties to the transaction, he
would not have been guilty of practicing law without a license.
Id. at 484-85 (quoting People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App. 2d 844, 846, 142 P.2d 960, 962
(1943)); see also Mickel v. Murphy, 147 Cal. App. 2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957) (generally,
the practice of law is not involved in the function of a scrivener of legal instruments).
38. See, e.g., Anderson, 79 Bankr. at 482-85 (paralegal who interviewed debtor and
solicited information, selected and prepared bankruptcy schedules, and advised debtor of
legal rights engaged in unauthorized practice of law); People v. Landlords Professional
Serv., 178 Cal. App. 3d 68, 69, 223 Cal. Rptr. 483, 483 (1986) (tenant eviction firm violated
unauthorized practice of law rules by "conduct[ing] interviews with its clients, elicit[ing]
information during the interview, select[ing] and prepar[ing] appropriate forms from the
information elicited during the interview ... [and] counselling] clients concerning the judicial
process of eviction"); Sipper, 61 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 846, 142 P.2d at 962 (real estate
agent acted outside the scope of scrivener and thus violated unauthorized practice of law
rules by advising a couple on which type of document to execute to secure a loan).
39. Opinions of the ethics committees are not binding on Bar members or the courts;
the opinions are advisory only. See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-100(A)
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terpretations: 'one who fills in the blanks' in standard forms or
otherwise performs only clerical work is typically not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law." 40 The ethics opinions draw a very fine
line between clerical and legal work, however. If the lay practitioner
actually drafts or even selects the correct form to be used, she has
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.4' This opinion, if adopted
by the courts, would render illegal many lay practitioners' activities
including work in the areas of divorce, probate, and real estate. 42
The Bar's prosecutorial discretion traditionally has followed the
guidelines set by the California courts. As early as the late 1970s,
the California Bar "recognized that a policy of prohibiting pro se
services was not likely to succeed in preventing the continual spon-
taneous appearance of such services." ' 43 During the period from the
late 1970s to the early 1980s, the Bar instead attempted to regulate
the unauthorized practice of law by requiring lay practitioners to sign
consent forms in which they agreed to limit their practices by only
offering scrivener or stenographer services and to furnish a legal
warning to all potential customers before payment." According to
the former director of the California State Bar's Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law Committee, no complaint was acted on unless a clear
showing of public harm could be made.4 5 Enforcement was directed
against fraudulent or reckless activities resulting in actual harm or
a strong likelihood of harm. 46
Since January 1985, however, the Bar, pending its own devel-
opment of an effective policy and program, has left the prosecution
of the unauthorized practice of law to state prosecutors .47 This policy
(West 1989); Rules of Procedure of the Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility
and Conduct (Mar. 1989), reprinted in California Compendium on Professional Responsi-
bility II (A-2) (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter Compendium].
40. San Diego Ethics Opinion 7 (1983), reprinted in Compendium, supra note 39, at 1.
41. Id. (stating that among the acts which constitute the practice of law ... are the
preparation, drafting, selection or determination of the kind of legal document, or giving
advice with relation to any legal documents or matters); San Diego Ethics Opinion 12 (1983),
reprinted in Compendium, supra note 39 ("rendering advice or assistance in the selection,
preparation and filing of dissolution documents does ... constitute the unauthorized practice
of law").
42. Ethics Opinion 7, supra note 40 (stating that a lay practitioner who provided services
relating to corporate formation, bankruptcy filing, maintenance and dissolution, and real
estate violated the unauthorized practice of law statute); Ethics Opinion 12, supra note 41
(stating that a divorce center violated the unauthorized practice of law statute).
43. Michelman, supra note 15, at 55 n.189.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 38 n.135 (citing a July 1982 conversation with R. Burkett, former Unau-
thorized Practice of Law Director of the Bar).
46. Id. at 38.
47. See REPORT I, supra note 12, at 9; REPORT II, supra note 12, at 7.
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of non-enforcement by the Bar and the prosecutors' lack of time and
funds have left a gap between the law and enforcement. 48 Conse-
quently, lay practitioners are in a state of limbo: the state prosecutors
and bar authorities could begin prosecuting, and the courts could
begin to condemn, practices that they presently appear to condone. 49
I. Dissatisfaction with the Present Legal System
Two main criticisms have been leveled at the current structure
of the California legal system: lack of access to legal services and
lack of public participation in legal structuring decisions. Critics ar-
gue that deregulation of the practice of law would best remedy these
deficiencies. 0 These critics reject the argument that rules prohibiting
the unauthorized practice of law protect the public and the court
system, and instead assert that the rules serve mainly to protect law-
yers by keeping the supply of legal services low and the cost high."
Inarguably, a large segment of society is being deprived of legal
services.12 Gerry Singsen, former vice president of Legal Services
Corporation,53 estimates that Legal Services and private pro bono
satisfy only fifteen percent of the total legal needs of those persons
whose income falls below the poverty line.5 4 He did not estimate how
48. See REPORT I, supra note 12, at 7.
49. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 1.
51. See supra note 9.
52. Chalfie, Break the Lawyer's Legal Advice Monopoly, Newsday, Dec. 3, 1989, at 4
(One recent study shows eight out of 10 low-income Illinois residents are unable to get legal
help with civil problems when needed; moreover, nearly 130 million people are "shut out
of America's legal system because lawyers cost too much." Another study shows that New
York's poor face nearly three million legal problems per year without legal help).
53. Legal Services Corporation was created by the Legal Services Corporation Act of
1974, Pub. L. 93-355, 88 Stat. 388 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1982)), with a
mandate "to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation for individuals
who seek redress of grievances" and "to provide high quality legal assistance to those who
would be otherwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel." Legal Services Corporation
gives funds to private legal services programs throughout the country who then provide legal
assistance in civil matters to the poor. 1987-1988 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FACT BOOK
ix (1989).
54. Miskiewicz, Volunteerism Alone Not Enough: Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disap-
pear, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 1. A nationwide study sponsored by the ABA determined
that in 1987 there were approximately 4.9 million civil legal problems for which low income
households (those at or below 125% of federal poverty guidelines) had legal assistance and
approximately 19 million civil legal problems for which there was no legal help-a ratio of
about one to four. 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENT OF THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR AND
THE PUBLIC GENERALLY, A.B.A. CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC 37-38
(May 1989) reprinted in REPORT II, supra note 12, at Supp. Appendix 14 [hereinafter ABA
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the remaining eighty-five percent solve their legal problems. Part of
this unmet need is caused by the defunding of Legal Services during
the 1980s.55 From 1981 to. 1990 low income discretionary program
funding, which finances Legal Services, was decreased by 30.7 per-
cent after accounting for inflation.5 6
Lack of access to legal assistance burdens more than the poor.
One study showed that middle America-those above the lowest
twenty percent of the income levels and below the highest ten percent
of the income levels-was not receiving or using legal services when
these services would have been "highly useful or appropriate."5' 7 A
STUDY].
A state-wide study conducted in Illinois in 1989 reported the same ratio-80% of the civil
legal needs of the poor go unmet-among the poor in Illinois. ILLINOIS LEGAL NEEDS STUDY
2 (1990) reprinted in REPORT II, supra note 12, at Supp. Appendix 15 at 2. The study cited
the "[d]rastic reductions in funding from the federal Legal Services Corporation" as a
factor. Id.
In New York the lack of legal services is even more pressing: A 1987 study found that
only approximately 14% of the New York poor in need of civil legal services have their
needs met. NEW YoRK LEGAL NEEDS STUDY DRAFT FINAL REPORT 197-98 (Oct. 11, 1989)
reprinted in REPORT II, supra note 12, at Supp. Appendix 17.
See also SPECIAL CoMM. ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, A.B.A., CoMPiILATON OF REFERENCE
MATERIALS ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 7 (1974) (setting forth a number of studies and
surveys on the need for and usage of legal services conducted between 1950 and 1980).
Although outside the scope of this Note, see Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes:
The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986), for an account of the various studies performed on the
lack of funding of indigent defense and criminal services.
55. Private legal services foundations receive other sources of funds, but Legal Services
Corporation is the chief provider. In 1988, Legal Services Corporation provided $295,340,727
(approximately 69% of the total funds); other federal sources (grants from Title XX of the
Social Security Act and the Older Americans Act) provided $27,678,482 (approximately 8%;
private contributions (United Way, Interest on Lawyers Trust Account, bar associations)
provided $67,785,000 (approximately 1.6%); and state and local governments provided
$33,755,000. 1988-1989 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FACT-BooK 20-26 (1990). To put a
proper perspective on these nationwide figures, note that California's share of the above
sums amounts to funding of $9.67 per poor person in California (using a poverty rate of
100% of the federal poverty rate). Id. at 21.
56. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Robert Greenstein, Director, Table 2 (Dec.
26, 1989). The decrease is calculated using the GNP deflator with inflation set at 4.4%.
In general, the American public has not approved of these decreases in spending for
Legal Services and other legal public assistance programs. An April, 1981 CBS-New York
Times poll conducted before the funding decreases of the 1980s indicated that 83% of those
polled supported the same level or an increased level of funding for legal assistance; only
13% favored a decrease in spending. R. BROWNSTEIN & N. EASTON, REAGAN'S RULING CLASS
429 (1982).
57. Meserve, Our Forgotten Client: The Average American, 57 A.B.A. J. 1092, 1093
(1971). See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 15, at 26. Christensen observes:
Although the number of law graduates seems to be increasing, the supply of
lawyers expected to be available in the immediate future may well be inadequate
to handle even a slight over-all increase in the middle-class public's use of lawyers'
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study commissioned by the Legal Aid Society of Orange County,
California, confirmed that a legal services gap exists between those
above the federal poverty guidelines and those able to afford a law-
yer. 58
The public not only lacks sufficient affordable legal services, but
also an adequate say in how legal services are regulated. Although
the American Bar Association and the California Bar recognize that
the profession's unique powers of self-government place a burden on
the various state bars to ensure their actions are conducted for the
public's benefit,5 9 they traditionally have defined the public's legal
needs without the public's input. 60 One commentator argues that "by
design or neglect, the organized bar has settled on an approach in-
volving low-visibility enforcement efforts by state and local unau-
thorized practice committees, attended by as little public discussion
as possible." ' 61 Undeniably, a large portion of the public believes that
services, just as it seems already to be inadequate to supply the demand being
uncovered by the legal services program for the poor.
Possible answers to why these groups are not using legal services include the actual and
sometimes over-exaggerated fear of the high costs of legal help and even the fear of lawyers
and legal processes themselves. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
58. The study found that of those persons referred by the Orange County Legal Aid
Society to private attorneys because the applicants made too much money, 87.2% could not
afford the fees or the fees would be higher than the financial reward from the case. Nearly
70% of those persons had jobs. Saari, Study: Legal Aid Aids Few, Orange County Register,
June 7, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
59. The Preamble to the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) states that:
[Alithough other professions also have been granted powers of self-government,
the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship
between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement ...
[This] relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities . . . . [The Bar]
must assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in
furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the [B]ar.
It would be virtually impossible, however, to eradicate all action based on self-interest.
If one considers legal work a "public good," furthering lawyers' interests furthers society's
interests to some extent. Of course we do not live in a perfect society in which all intents
held and work accomplished by lawyers are both legally and morally correct. Thus, there is
the need for some form of strict scrutiny of lawyers' actions.
60. For example, although the California State Bar Board of Governors, the governing
authority of the Bar, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6008.4, 6010 (West 1990), was created in
1927, see id. § 6010 (history and statutory notes), it was not until 1975 that members of
the public were allowed to serve on the Board. Id. § 6013.5. But see infra notes 133-138
and accompanying text for an account of the Bar's increased public accountability and infra
note 113 for the Bar's recognition of the unmet need for access to legal services.
61. Rhode, supra note 1, at 4. Her survey vividly supports this: information was kept
by the unauthorized practice of law committees in only about half (22 of 45) of the
jurisdictions she surveyed, and information was published in only about one-fourth (12 of
45). Id. at 21. California data reflect a similarly low visibility enforcement process: of the
1450 inquiries and complaints against lay practitioners received by California Bar officials
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the freedom to choose whether to use an expensive lawyer or cheaper
lay practitioner must belong to the public.
Commentators argue that this perception of impotence robs the
public of personal autonomy.62 Rhode emphasizes the rights of self-rep-
resentation and freedom of speech, focusing on their expressive, edu-
cational, and political significances. 63 She cites, as an example of the use
of lay legal services to effectuate social and political reform, feminists
who have developed divorce kits and clinics to promote competence and
independence in women.64 By proceeding pro Se, the argument goes,
women do not need to rely on a traditionally male-dominated profession.
Proponents of deregulation argue that deregulation would solve the
problems of the lack of access to and control over legal services by in-
creasing the supply and decreasing the cost of legal services. One typical
free-market advocate explains, "[A] freely competitive market would
bring down fees, increase consumer choice and better protect clients
than does today's closed monopolistic guild." '65
The advocates of deregulation argue that the distinction between
clerical services, already accepted by the courts, and personalized
instructions and advice is not rational. The main thrust of the de-
regulation argument is that there is no clear proof that the practice
of law by lay practitioners harms society. 66 Rhode conducted a survey
from consumers in 1979, only 42 (3%) were directed to law enforcement agencies. Id. at 28
(taken from Interview with Director, California Unauthorized Practice Dept., Oct. 1980).
As a point of reference, the Bar received 6946 complaints about lawyers in 1981; 938
complaints were investigated (13.5%). News Background, supra note 19, at 9. Of these, 70
resulted in reprovals, 92 in suspensions and disbarments, and 113 in admonitions or warnings.
Id.
62. B. CmuSRsENS, supra note 1, at 201-04; See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 857.
One may suspect that Christensen's and Wolfram's clamor for freedom of choice actually
masks a dislike of government regulation. Christensen refers to George Orwell's 1984 and
asserts, "Citizens are'everywhere hemmed'in by rules, regulations, restrictions, and restraints
that have been imposed upon them by officious, often self-anointed, and usually arrogant
guardians, both governmental and private, who have undertaken to do their thinking for
them." B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 1, at 202; see C. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 856-57
(suggesting his antipathy towards government regulation).
Another commentator argues that Christensen's deference to the public interest in freedom
of choice is "not necessarily realistic where individuals at middle and lower income levels
not uncommonly become involved in complex transactions with private entities or confron-
tations with bureaucracies .... [S]ociety also has an interest in seeing that decisions affecting
legal rights are made efficiently, and in a responsible and fully informed manner." Mich-
elman, supra note 15, at 21 n.75.
63. Rhode, supra note 1, at 70-73.
64. Id. at 72 (referring to Jacobs, The Wave Project, in Tm PEoPLE's LAW REVIEw
153, 157-58 (R. Warner ed. 1980)). Cf. Michelman, supra note 15, at 25-31 (arguing that
first amendment interests rarely are implicated by lay practitioner advertising).
65. Bandow, supra note 2, at 2, col. 3.
66. See e.g., Christensen, supra note 1, at 203 ("there is comparatively little in the
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of state officials patrolling the unauthorized practice of law in forty-
five jurisdictions, including California. 67 She found that the com-
mittees regulating the unauthorized practice of law processed only
2,669 inquiries, complaints, and investigations in 1979.6 Surpris-
ingly, a mere thirty-nine percent of the committees and bars surveyed
reported any direct consumer complaints (as opposed to complaints
filed by lawyers, judges, or other third parties) and only twenty-one
percent indicated that these complaints had alleged specific injury. 69
The proponents of deregulation further argue that many of the
legal areas in which lay practitioners operate or would operate if
allowed are not taught adequately in law schools. 70 In fact, lawyers
often shunt these types of legal problems to secretaries or paralegals
and never review the results. 71 A Connecticut study of uncontested
divorces indicated that pro se litigants did about as well as lawyers
in form preparation and court proceedings.7 2 In some areas such as
timeliness of filing papers, the pro se litigants actually did better than
the lawyers. 73 Therefore, advocates of deregulation argue, cheaper
lay practitioners would provide much-needed competition for law-
history of unauthorized practice, either in the literature or in the cases, by way of hard
evidence of substantial actual injury to the public through the activity of unauthorized
practitioners").
67. Rhode, supra note 1, at 14. Her survey excludes Connecticut, Washington, Penn-
sylvania, and seven other states that are not active in unauthorized practice of law regulation:
Alaska, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Vermont. Id. at 14-15.
See infra notes 167-177 and accompanying text for a criticism of this survey.
68. Id. at 22-23. California alone accounted for 54% of the 2699 inquiries, investiga-
tions, and complaints. Id. at 22, 43. See also News Background, supra note 19, at 8 (the
California Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee receives over 1000 unauthorized practice
of law complaints each year).
69. Rhode, supra note 1, at 33. Notably the data from California, which accounted for
over half of the total injuries, and three other states was excluded because exact data was
unavailable. Id. at 33 n.89. Rhode does add in a footnote that the then director of
California's Department of Unauthorized Practice, "during the course of a single interview,
• . .variously estimated that one-third, two-fifths, and one-half" of the complaints involved
consumer injury. Id. at 33 n.87.
70. Id. at 86. "[I]t is not self-evident that professional certification or supervision
insures special competence. Few, if any, accredited law schools or bar examinations require
facility in completing the documents required for uncontested divorces or real estate trans-
actions." Curiously, Rhode does not use the above observation to argue that a better system
for training lawyers should be developed, but rather to argue that lay practitioners need not
be competently trained either.
71. Id. at 87.
72. Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 123-29 (1976).
73. Id. at 126. The Commission on Legal Technicians, see supra note 12, also conducted
a survey of client satisfaction and found that only 64% of those respondents who used
lawyers were happy with the overall service, while 76016 of those who used other providers
were happy. REPORT II, supra note 12, at 14.
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yers, which would encourage lawyers to increase their own level of
competence. 74
III. Proposal by the California Public Protection
Committee
The complaints of lack of accessibility to legal services, little
accountability to the public, and unjustifiable lawyer monopoly of
legal services stirred the California Bar into action in 1988. The Bar
formed the Public Protection Committee to examine the rules re-
garding the unauthorized practice of law and to consider the pos-
sibility of deregulation.
To ensure public involvement, the Bar invited a wide cross-sec-
tion of the public to serve on the Committee. 75 The Bar's Board of
Governors'ultimately chose eight people: four lawyers76 and four non-
lawyers. 77 The Board charged the Committee to investigate six spe-
cific issues: whether public harm is likely to occur from the lay prac-
tice of law; whether the harm warrants regulation; what form the
regulation should take; who should be in charge of the regulation;
who should pay for the regulation; and what might be an appropriate
time-table for consideration of these issues. 78 This Part sketches the
Committee's investigatory activities and findings and concludes with
its final proposal.
74. B. CHMSTENSEN, supra note 15, at 215-16.
75. REPORT I, supra note 12, at 2. The Bar's Board Committee on Professional Standards
invited legal professionals (attorneys, legal academics, and retired judges); non-legal profes-
sionals (real estate brokers, bankers, certified public accountants, title company employees,
insurance professionals, and public notaries); members of paralegal associations; members
of tenant and landlord associations; representatives of consumer protection agencies; people
involved in legal service programs; and people involved in local law enforcement.
76. Joseph R. Austin, Chair (business trial lawyer with the Los Angeles firm Tuttle &
Taylor), id. at 2, 16; Stephen R. Elias (Nolo Press writer and editor, teacher of legal
research to non-lawyers and legal research and advocacy to paralegals, and author and co-
author of books on subjects such as do-it-yourself contracts and wills), id. at 2, 22-24;
Aggie R. Hoffman (immigration and nationality law specialist, prior chair of American
Immigration Lawyers Association Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee), id. at 2, 26;
Stephen E. Taylor (Deputy District Attorney for San Joaquin County in charge of the
District Attorney's Consumer and Business Affairs division), id. at 2, 31.
77. Victor Salazar, Vice Chair (consumer protection professional, member of California
Consumer Affairs Association, member of Legal Services Trust Fund Commission of the
State Bar of California), id. at 2, 28-30; Fian Chernowsky (self-employed paralegal who
provides services exclusively to lawyers, former President of the Los Angeles Paralegal
Associationi in 1985 and 1986), id. at 2, 18-21; Tim Pluma (self-employed paralegal who
provides services exclusively to lawyers, President of Paralegal-Plus Placement Service,
former President of Los Angeles Paralegal Associationjn 1987), id. at 2, 27; Michael D.
West (self-employed mediator and arbitrator), id. at 32.
78. Id. at 2.
November 1990] LAY PRACTITIONERS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
A. Activities of the Committee
The Committee engaged in three information-gathering activi-
ties: its own investigation and research, 79 public hearings,80 and sur-
veys of California consumer protection agencies8' and state bars. 2
Press releases were circulated before each hearing,83 and the Com-
mittee sent invitations offering individuals and organizations the op-
portunity to appear at the hearings or submit written comment. 84 The
questionnaires were sent to the consumer protection agencies to de-
termine the extent and location of harm arising from the lay practice
of law and how these agencies processed complaints. 85 The ques-
tionnaires sent to the state bars solicited information with regard to
their regulation and definition of the practice of law and asked
whether they had studied the impact of lay practitioners offering le-
gal services. 86
B. Results of the Investigation, Public Hearings, and Surveys
In contrast to Rhode's survey, 7 the Committee found that "there
is significant potential for public harm caused by the activities of
79. For a partial bibliography of the law review entries, cases, statutes, and rules
reviewed by the Committee, see id. at 42-47.
80. Three hearings were conducted: one in Los Angeles on June 16, 1987, one in San
Francisco on September 15, 1987, and one in Fresno on October 8, 1987. Id. at 3.
81. Surveys were sent to 126 California consumer protection agencies, including the
consumer protection division of each local and statewide district attorney's office in Cali-
fornia. Id. at 4-5.
82. The state bars included voluntary and integrated bar associations where appropriate,
the Bar of the District of Columbia, and the Bar of Puerto Rico. Id. at 5.
83. The releases were sent to 150 daily newspapers, 50 legal dailies, and 30 minority
papers. In Los Angeles, Spanish translations were distributed. The first release also was
forwarded to 260 bar leaders. Id. at 3.
84. Over 600 invitations were sent to various parties, including all California law
schools, law libraries, bankruptcy judges listed in the PARKER DICTIONARY OF CALIFORNIA
ATTORNEYS (1987), all paralegal training institutions according to a listing provided by the
Los Angeles Paralegal Association, legal aid foundations, and government entities (listed by
the Office of the Attorney General, Cal. Consumer Protection Agencies Directory (Apr.
1987)). Id. at 3, 4. The meeting in Los Angeles had 34 speakers; San Francisco had 24
speakers; and Fresno had 28 speakers. Id. at 3. The Committee received 74 written comments.
Id. at 3-4. A total of more than 770 pages of reporters' transcripts was made, creating an
appioximately 1500-page record. Id.
85. Id. at 4, 39.
86. Id. at 5, 40-41.
87. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
legal technicians.""8 They determined that the primary risks of harm
from legal technicians are consumer fraud from false and misleading
advertising, false representation and promises, and intentional fail-
ures to perform.8 9 Negligence was determined to be of secondary, but
nonetheless significant, importance. 90 The Committee found that
"[e]ither because of the demand or the current structure of the mar-
ketplace, unscrupulous services most frequently appeal to individuals
when they are most vulnerable and offer services that could cause
far-reaching, and often disastrous, consequences if not performed in
a timely and correct manner." 91
The Committee found that although the fear of prosecution
causes some practitioners to limit the scope of their activities, 92 the
current enforcement mechanisms93 generally provide "inadequate
protection against the risk of public harm." 94 The Committee stressed
its belief that the inherent vagueness of the term "practice of law"
renders enforcement difficult. 95
After noting these harms, the Committee apparently balanced
the positive findings against the negative and concluded that "the
88. REPoRT I, supra note 12, at 7. The Committee used the term "legal technician"
throughout its report to designate "a non-lawyer who provides law-related services to
members of the public." Id. at 1 n.1. The Committee distinguished legal technicians from
"dependant paralegals," defined by the Committee as direct employees of individual lawyers
and law firms or indirect contractors who contract to do work solely for lawyers and law
firms. Because dependent paralegals do not provide services directly to the public, the
Committee determined that no risk of harm results from their activities. This group thus
was excluded from the Committee's report. Id. at 7.
89. Id. at 8. The Committee did find, however, a "number of highly qualified and
dedicated legal technicians who deliver valuable assistance to individuals for fair consider-
ation." Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 7. The Committee especially noted abuses by notary and immigration con-
sultation services: "In many countries worldwide, only licensed lawyers may serve as notaries
and, in many other countries, appointment to the position of 'notary' designates the elevated
status of a lawyer." Id. at 8. Furthermore, because many of the immigrants and less-
knowledgeable segments of the population who rely on U.S. notaries cannot speak English
and are in the country illegally, they are even more susceptible to abuse. Id. at 33. Their
vulnerability to deportation magnifies the consequences of fraud or incompetence. Id. The
Committee thus concluded that "[s]ome further regulation of notaries is required to help
alleviate the deceptive practices of some notaries." Id. at 8.
92. Id.
93. See supra Part I B.
94. REPoRT I, supra note 12, at 7.
95. [T]he activities of many legal technicians could arguably be called the practice
of law. The problem is that, in our law-dominated society, many fairly common
activities fall within the traditional definition of what constitutes the practice of
law. Thus when the State Bar's "treaties" that permitted certain other professionals
to practice law with impunity were invalidated, the concept of unauthorized practice
became incapable of meaningful definition and therefore unenforceable.
Id. at 8-9. See C. WoxRmu, supra note 1, at 826 for an explanation of these treaties.
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overwhelming need to provide better access to legal services justifies
some risk of individual harm." 96 The Committee found the need for
increased access most compelling at the "lower-to-mid levels" of the
legal processes, defined as landlord-tenant, immigration, family law,
and bankruptcy, areas in which lawyers inexplicably could not or
would not provide proper services.
97
C. The Committee's Recommendations
The Committee's recommendations centered on three main pro-
visions: replacing the rules regulating the unauthorized practice of
law with rules solely precluding the use of the title "lawyer," re-
quiring registration of lay practitioners, and providing certain civil
and criminal penalties for violation of these rules. 9
(1) Abolishing the Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules
The Committee strictly rejected licensing and other "bureauc-
racy-laden" regulation on the assumption that such regulation would
simply restrict competition rather than protect consumers. 99 It also
determined it would be "impossible to fashion [a licensing system]
wisely . . . in advance given the large number of different activities
that would be subject to it."' l Instead, the Committee proposed re-
placing traditional prohibitions on the lay practice of law with leg-
islation that simply would make it a misdemeanor for anyone who
is not an active member of the California Bar to claim to be an at-
torney.
(2) Registration and Disclosure
To practice law in the quasi-deregulated environment envisioned
by the Committee, a lay person simply would register as a "legal
technician' 1o and pay a filing fee. Curiously, to define the term "legal
technician," the Committee was forced to do what it asserted it could
96. Report I, supra note 12, at 7.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 9-13 for the exact language of the Committee's proposals.
99. Id. at 10.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 88 for the exact definition of a "legal technician."
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not do earlier, namely to define "the practice of law." 10 2 The legal
technician then would be able to offer her services for any legal mat-
ter, excluding actual in-court representation. 103 These services pre-
sumably could range from the relatively simple filing of an
uncontested divorce action to the investigation and preparation of
a criminal charge of murder (excluding the actual in-court repre-
sentation). The practitioner's only duty beyond registration would
be to obtain a written waiver from her client attesting that the client
understands that the practitioner is not an attorney. 104 In the absence
of such a written waiver, the courts would presume that the tech-
nician represented herself as an attorney. 105
(3) Remedies
The Committee's proposal provides civil remedies including rea-
sonable attorney's fees and court costs to the prevailing party for
harm resulting from a technician's negligence. ' 6 If, in conjunction
with this harm, the technician is found to have misrepresented herself
as an attorney, the court would award treble damages to the injured
client. 10 7 The proposal also provides injunctive relief and civil pen-
alties for registration violations, diversion of funds under $1,000,
and withholding of client documents. 108 Lastly, the proposal provides
criminal penalties for the intentional diversion of client funds of over
$1,000.109
The Committee concluded that "at present in California there
is no adequate regulatory model and no agency staffed to assume
management of a regulatory scheme if adopted." 110 The Committee
did not specify an agency to organize and manage the registration,
but did assert that the Bar should not be directly involved because
102. This ability of the Committee to define the practice of law removes one asserted
argument for deregulation, namely that the "practice of law" is undefinable and thus not
possible to regulate. See supra text accompanying note 95. The true issue becomes not the
inability to define the practice of the law, but the appropriateness or fairness of allowing
one group, namely members of the California Bar, to control such a large block of activities.
See supra notes 59-65, infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
103. REPORT 1, supra note 12, at 10.
104. Id. at 11.
105. Id. The Committee did not specify if and how the legal technician might rebut this
presumption.
106. Id. at 12-13.
107. Id. at 12.
108. Id. at 12-13.
109. Id. at 12.
110. Id. at 5. The Committee also noted that public prosecutors normally have the
resources and energies to deal with only the major frauds of legal technicians. Id. at 7.
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it "would be a serious political and public relations mistake.""'
D. The California Bar's Response to the Committee's Report and its
Present Status
The Bar has authorized the release of the Committee's report
but has not approved its contents.' 12 The Bar has accepted the prop-
osition that lay practitioners may be able to satisfy some of the need
for legal aid," 3 but it is not ready to accept the view that the benefits
of full deregulation would outweigh the costs." 4 The Bar instead cre-
ated a ten-member commission," 5 the Commission on Legal Tech-
nicians (Commission), to study the fine-tuning of the Committee's
proposal. The Commission has the duty to determine guidelines for
practice by lay practitioners that will best protect the public, in-
cluding standards for training, licensing, and regulation; the entity
that should be responsible for their regulation; and the areas of prac-
tice and scope of tasks that they may perform." 6 Notably, the Com-
mission comprises a more diverse group of people than those who
served on the Committee: 1 7 three lawyers, two members of the ju-
diciary, two nonlawyer providers of law-related services, two con-
sumer representatives, and one representative from the Department
of Consumer Affairs."' The Commission was given until July 1, 1990,
to complete its study. 1 9
111. Id. at 8. The Committee determined that the Bar's involvement would be viewed
as self-interested and "[s]ince we find that most lawyers are not providing legal services in
these areas ... [there would be no corresponding] economic benefit to members of the
State Bar." Id.
112. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR, Public Release Letter (1989) [hereinafter Letter] (available
at the California State Bar). The Bar also sought public comment on the report. Two
hearings, one in San Francisco on January 19, 1989, and one in Los Angeles on January
26, 1989, sought written or spoken comment on the Committee's report and alternative
solutions. Id. at 3.
113. The Bar resolved that "there is an overwhelming unmet need of California residents
for better access to the legal process, and that 'legal technicians' may provide greater access
so long as their activities do not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the public." BOARD
OF GOVERNORS, STATE BAR OF CAL., Resolution (Aug. 26, 1989) [hereinafter Resolution].
114. Letter, supra note 112. Outgoing Bar President Colin Wied warned that opening
the practice of law to lay practitioners could endanger the quality of legal services given to
the public. Reuter Libr. Rep., Aug. 26, 1989, at 1. Present Bar President P. Terry Anderlini
complained that "my 6-year-old son could register and offer you legal advice." Nat'l L.J.,
May 16, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
115. Resolution, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. Hall, supra note 7, at 1, col. 4.
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The Commission released its report' 20 to the public on August
30, 1990.21 In summary, the Commission advocated allowing lay
practitioners, labeled "independent paralegals," to engage in the
practice of law only in the fields of bankruptcy, family law, and
landlord-tenant law. Other areas could be opened'up eventually.
1 22
These independent paralegals would be under the supervision and
administration of the Director of the Department of Consumer Af-
fairs, subject to oversight by the California Supreme Court, which
has final authority to approve any rules and regulations of the in-
dependent paralegals. 23
The report is being circulated for public comment for ninety
days, which will lapse on November 28, 1990.124 The Bar has not yet
approved the Commission's proposal.' 25 If the Bar decides to approve
the proposal, it then would be up to the California legislature and
the California Supreme Court to redefine the present laws and court
rules that regulate the practice of law.' 26 The legislature also would
have to give the Department of Consumer Affairs the power to su-
pervise and administer the system.
The Bar is not required to approve either the Committee's pro-
posal or the Commission's proposal. If the Bar decides to choose
between the two, however, it undoubtedly will approve the less-rad-
ical Commission's proposal. Probably foreseeing this, two California
senators have sponsored identical bills that essentially mirror the
Committee's proposal.' 27
The next Part analyzes how deregulation would affect the legal
system, using the Committee's proposal as a basis of critique. 28 Tak-
ing into account the deficiencies in the deregulation proposal, this
Note then counters with a proposal that will satisfy the opposing
factions-the Bar and the deregulation proponents-while still pro-
tecting the public and the judicial system.
120. REPORT II, supra note 12.
121. News Release (Aug. 30, 1990) [hereinafter News Release] (available at the California
State Bar Office of Professional Conduct).
122. REPORT II, supra note 12, at 1, 26.
123. Id. at 27.
124. News Release, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. These include sections 6125-6127 of the State Bar Act and California Rules of
Professional Conduct 1-300, 1-310, and 1-320, pursuant to sections 6076-6077 of the State
Bar Act.
127. See supra note 12.
128. The bulk of this Note, including its proposal, was developed before the Commission
issued its report. In addition, the Committee's report provides a clearer, more extreme
contrast to analyze the utility of varying degrees of deregulation than does the Commission's
more tempered approach.
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IV. A Critical Look at the Committee's Proposal to
Deregulate
The Committee's inclusion of the public in the creation of its
proposal is commendable. The composition of the Committee, the
public hearings, and the disclosure to the public during all phases
of the Committee's decision-making activities showed that both the
Committee and the Bar finally recognize that the interests of the pub-
lic and of the legal profession do not always coincide.
The Committee's proposal, unlike pure deregulation, calls for
some prophylactic measures such as registration and waiver disclo-
sure, as well as remedial measures including civil and criminal lia-
bility. Because the Committee underestimates the dangers of
deregulation and overestimates the benefits of deregulation, however,
these prophylactic and remedial measures are not strong enough.
Specifically, the Committee overemphasizes and overestimates the
Bar's monopoly power; idealistically assumes the market runs effi-
ciently, allowing persons to retrieve and utilize necessary informa-
tion; underemphasizes the need for a certain level of legal competence;
and fails to recognize the possible negative impact deregulation may
have on indigents. 2 9
A. The Competing Interests at Stake: The Extent and Effects of the
Bar's "Monopoly" Control of the Legal Profession
Recognition of the crucial balance of power at issue is the first
step in analyzing the Committee's deregulation proposal. Desires of
the legal profession aside, the problem can be viewed from two van-
tage points: that of the "would-be providers"-lay practitioners who
desire to break into the legitimate legal market, and that of the con-
sumers-clients who desire to have access to legal services. The Com-
mittee may have been overly swayed by the former group to the
detriment of the latter. Although the desires of the lay practitioners
are valid considerations, 13 0 it would be fruitless to replace one self-
interested regulatory system with another.'
129. The Committee's report lacks full explanations for many of its recommendations;
this Note therefore, hypothesizes at times on the underlying reasons behind the recommen-
dations.
130. This will be true not only because the occupational desires of lay practitioners are
valid concerns in framing legislation, but also because the voiced complaints of this group
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The deregulation movement also should not be motivated by a
desire to deregulate the legal market solely to wrench control of the
legal field from the Bar. Many commentators have focused myop-
ically on the power the various state bars have on legal regulation
and have over-estimated the effect of this power. 13 2 The Bar's "mo-
nopoly" power actually has decreased. 133 Furthermore, the "Bar" is
affect the rest of society's view of the law. This is an important consideration because the
belief in the processes of law affect the public's respect of the substance of the law itself.
131. The Board of Governors, in selecting the Committee's composition, arguably over-
represented the lay practitioners' interests. One-half of the Committee could be viewed as
having an interest in the outcome: Ms. Chernowsky (paralegal associations), Mr. Elias (Nolo
Press affiliations), Mr. Pluma (paralegal associations), and Mr. West (arbitration and
mediation). See supra notes 76-77. Three of the rest of the group could be viewed as having
an interest in maintaining the status quo: Mr. Austin (attorney), Mr. Hoffman (lawyer
affiliations), and Mr. Taylor (attorney). The final member, Ms. Salazar, represented con-
sumer protection interests and appears to have no professional interest. Id. By contrast, the
Commission members include two "non-lawyer providers of law-related services" and two
"representatives of consumers." See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text. This is a
better balancing of interests.
The fact that other professional groups operate freely seemed to weigh heavily in the
Committee's decision: "We find this threat of prosecution for unauthorized practice of law
unjustified, particularly in light of the virtually innumerable other services (real estate
brokers, title companies, accountants, bankers, tax preparers, to identify only a few) that
operate seemingly without risk of prosecution." REPORT I, supra note 12, at 8. This
accentuates the view of deregulation as a struggle for market control, rather than an altruistic
fight for the public's benefit.
132. [v]here [legal] professional actions can be attributed to more benign or
malevolent motivations, the latter seem always to be preferred. Higher educational
standards may have had a salutary effect on quality of care and on research and
the advancement of professional knowledge; professional ethics may have produced
higher levels of professional responsibility; and licensure may have protected the
gullible from exploitation and personal tragedy. That some of those aspects of
professionalism have also had monopolistic effects seems to have largely eclipsed
any beneficial consequences. Even if actions are not explicitly monopolistic, that
can be reinterpreted as strategic retreat or cunning strategy.
T. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY 350 (1987).
133. Id. at 351-52 (asserting that there has been a. voluntary 'professional divestiture'
of some traditional functions thought to be core elements of monopoly" of the practice of
law such as advertising and disciplinary activities, and an involuntary loss of monopoly
controls through court decisions such as those striking down minimum fee schedules);
Michelman, supra note 15, at 13 (asserting that "increased external control of the legal
profession by government agencies, clients, and the press has decidedly chilled the potentially'
anticompetitive policies of the organized bar in the last two decades") (quoting from Remarks
of Michael Powell, Research Social Scientist, The American Bar Foundation, "The Organ-
ization of the Profession," at the ABA Midyear Meeting, Jan. 1982); see M. Powell,
"Developments in the Regulation of Lawyers: Intra and Extra Professional Controls" (paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Toronto, Aug.
1981) (on file, ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Brief Bank)). Eugene Thomas,
former president of the ABA, vehemently argues against the assertion that lawyers engage
in the monopolistic practice of price-fixing:
[T]he American Bar Association code of ethical conduct holds excessive fees to
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not one cohesive group; factions often may compete with each other,
limiting monopoly power. 3 4 The California Bar presently comprises
almost 93,000 members; '35 a group this large cannot always act with
a unified voice.
Presently, the public actually does have some degree of internal
control over the California Bar. California law mandates that over
one-fourth of the Bar's Board of Governors be comprised of public
members who have never been members of any state's bar. 3 6 Nine
of the Bar's nineteen-member examining committee, which examines
Bar applicants and administers requirements for admission, must not
be members of the Bar. 3 7 California law further requires that the
three-member review department, which reviews decisions of the Bar's
examining committee, contain one non-lawyer.'38
Furthermore, the effect of the power that the Bar does hold is
not always harmful. Consolidation of control and the resulting econ-
omies of scale help enable the Bar to be an effective liaison between
individuals and the state. 39 The Bar's regulation of the legal pro-
fession also gives the state the freedom to spend its limited resources
elsewhere. 4
0
Although consideration of the Bar's control naturally may enter
into the decision whether to abolish the restrictions against the lay
practice of law, it should not be the sole factor. Rather, the focus
should be on the needs of the public. These needs can be divided into
two areas: the need for increased access to adequate legal services
at affordable costs; and the need for some individual autonomy-the
ability to choose when to use and when not to use a lawyer. Before
be unethical, and lawyers who collect them are subject to discipline. The profession
thus protects the public from unreasonable charges, and that is only possible under
a system policed by the courts and the bar. Consider that there never have been
price-fixing antitrust cases of any significance against lawyers. If there had been
"blatant price-fixing," the courts would have been full of such cases.
Thomas, The Hidden Agenda of the Radical Right, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1987, at 2, col.
6 (city ed.).
134. T. HALLIDAY, supra note 132, at 309, 350; B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 15, at 5-7.
135. THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 1990 at 163. These figures were effective December 1988
and January 1989. Id. at 164.
136. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6011, 6013.5 (West 1990). Six of the 22 board members
are non-lawyers, appointed for three-year terms each. Id.
137. Id. § 6046.
138. Id. § 6086.65.
139. T. HALLIDAY, supra note 132, at 362. Bar associations are "critically placed to
bring their monopolies of competence to the reform of constitutional controls over govern-
ment" and "can contribute to the redistribution of powers among branches of government."
Id. at 361-62.
140. Id. at 367-68.
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any deregulation may be considered, the benefit to the public of abol-
ishing the restrictions against the lay practice of law must outweigh
the costs.
B. Market Complexities that Render the Practice of Law Unsuitable
for a Free Market System
The Committee determined that the benefits of a combined mal-
practice and registration system outweigh the dangers of consumer
harm. The Committee, however, overestimates the benefits of de-
regulation. The price differential between lay practitioners and at-
torneys for a particular level of quality and quantity of service actually
may not be significant, and the free market's emphasis on cost alone
may result in lower quality legal services. The Committee also un-
derestimates the harms of deregulation. Specifically, informational
problems may render the poor unable to judge effectively between
lay competence and incompetence.
(1) Barriers to Entry in California and the Resulting Effect on Price
The Committee's proposal appears to be based on the idea that
deregulation will create a utopian market of increased supply and
lower price in which information on legal services is given freely and
correctly. Presently, there is a significant differential between the fees
charged by lay practitioners and those charged by "discount" law
firms located in San Francisco; typically, lawyers charge two to three
times more than lay practitioners. 41 This price differential may be
141. In the San Francisco area prices for preparing uncontested divorce forms range
from $45 to $245 (excluding court fees). Telephone interview with anonymous receptionist
at American Legal Centers, Inc. in Martinez (Jan. 31, 1990); telephone interview wijh
anonymous receptionist at Discount Divorce Service in San Francisco (Jan. 31, 1990);
telephone interview with anonymous receptionist at Divorce Center of California (Jan. 31,
1990). The "average" price for discount law firms was approximately $700 (excluding court
fees) (based on a $20 to $25 initial fee and a $100 to $150 per hour charge). Telephone
interview with anonymous receptionist at the Attorney Referral Service of the Bar Ass'n of
San Francisco (Feb. 1, 1990); telephone interview with anonymous receptionist at Hyatt
Legal Services in San Francisco (Feb. 1, 1990); telephone interview with anonymous recep-
tionist at Jacoby & Myers in San Francisco (Feb. 1, 1990).
The Commission's study supports these fee differentials. The Commission sent out surveys
to various California courthouses that were distributed or made available to persons filing
in pro per. REPOORT II, supra note 12, at 10. The respondents stated that cost was the
number-one factor in choosing between legal services. Id. at 14. For those respondents who
received assistance from a lawyer, 30% paid no fee (assumedly the assistance was through
a legal service pragram or private pro bono service), but 8% paid over $750. Id. Of those
using another kind of provider, 42% paid between $100 and $250, but only four percent
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a factor of the differences in quantity and quality of services offered.
The price for a stenographer's typing and filing of a pre-made di-
vorce form should not equal the price for a lawyer's preparation of
a divorce tailored to a specific client.
142
The Committee and other deregulation advocates argue, how-
ever, that this price differential is not based on the fact that attorneys
may provide advice and instruction along with their services. 143 In-
stead they assume that the fees charged by lay practitioners will re-
main measurably lower even after lay practitioners are allowed to
offer legal advice and instruction. This assumption itself rests on two
underlying assumptions: that presently there are few, if any, attor-
neys providing help with immigration, landlord-tenant, divorce, and
other types of services that lay practitioners would provide; and that
even if attorneys are providing these services, barriers to entry such
as law school tuition and entrance exams drive the price of these
services well above what lay practitioners would charge for the same
services if deregulated. 14"
The first underlying assumption arguably is incorrect because
many lawyers do provide these services. 145 The second underlying
assumption is debatable. The effects of licensing requirements, in-
cluding education and bar exams, do not manifest themselves nec-
essarily in higher fees. One study found ambiguous correlations
between exam failure rates, aggregate attorney income, and corre-
paid over $750. Id. Because the Report did not break down the services with the costs, it
is not possible to determine if a more complete service provision or different type of
provision caused the price differential.
In contrast, data compiled by the National Association for Independent Paralegals actually
shows that independent paralegals may charge higher fees than lawyers for bankruptcy
services and comparable fees for probate services. Choosing an Independent Paralegal, Nolo
Press News, vol. 10, No. 3, Fall 1990, at 3.
From the above, obviously whether lay practitioners charge more for their services depends
on the type of service rendered.
142. Note, however, that if the divorce sought is "simple," non-contested, and does not
involve children, then the price differential becomes significant. This anticipates the basis
for this Note's argument, see infra Part IV A, that certain legal services that are capable
of standardization can be offered safely and less expensively by lay practitioners than by
most fully-trained lawyers.
143. One study shows that consumers, at least, perceive that a difference exists between
lay practitioners' services and lawyers' services. The ABA study, see supra note 54, found
that a significant number of persons (43%) who had used a lay practitioner to resolve a
legal problem did believe that a lawyer would have made a difference in the outcomes of
their cases. Id. at 34, reprinted in REPORT II, supra note 12, at Supp. Appendix 14.
144. See REPORT I, supra note 12, at 11. A corollary to the latter assumption is that lay
practitioners will not increase their fees to cover the costs of additional education required
to offer deregulated personalized legal services and insurance necessary to guard against
potential liability if they incompetently provide these services. This assumption may be
unrealistic.
145. See infra notes 141, 205 and accompanying text.
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sponding costs to clients.' 46 Supply alone cannot be the culprit: as
of 1988 there were more than 725,000 licensed lawyers in theUnited
States.' 47 For the academic year 1988-1989, 45,999 lawyers were ad-
mitted to the American Bar,' 48 and 6144 were admitted to the Cal-
ifornia Bar.' 49 Moreover, California has especially low barriers to
entry due to less stringent law school requirements.1 50 Thus, the as-
sumptions may be somewhat optimistic that a lay practitioner's fees
would be significantly lower if a lawyer and lay practitioner were to
offer the same services..
(2) Free Market's Emphasis on Cost and Possible Resulting Lower
Quality of Legal Services
Even if it were true that lay practitioners can provide the same
services at a lower price, a pure market system may encourage im-
146. Getz, Siegfried & Calvani, Competition at the Bar: The Correlation between the
Bar Examination Pass Rate and the Profitability of Practice, 67 VA. L. REv. 863, 879 (1981)
("contrary to the conclusions drawn by several earlier reports, bar exams may not be anti-
competitive"). Admittedly, bar exams do exclude a good proportion of the would-be bar.
Out of a total of 67,888 people who took bar examinations in 1988, 45,054 passed, for a
passage rate of approximately 66%. THE LAWYER's ALMANAC 1990, supra note 135, at 257.
In California, out of the 11,741 who took the February 1988 and July 1988 bar exams,
5851 passed, for a 49.8% passage rate. Of those who passed, 4878 were from ABA approved
schools, 924 from unaccredited law schools, and 4 by law office study. Id. at 255. A person
may take the bar exam an unlimited number of times.
147. THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 1990, supra note 135 at 163-64.
148. Id. at 260.
149. Id. This number may overrepresent the number of lawyers, however, because a
person may seek admission to more than one jurisdiction.
150. The Bar allows persons to practice law upon the passage of two education or
apprenticeship requirements. First, before beginning the study of law, a person must have
completed two years of college work or "[h]ave attained in apparent intellectual ability the
equivalent of at least two years of the college work hereinabove defined." CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6060(c) (West 1990). Second, a person must either have graduated from an
accredited law school or:
[s]tudied law diligently and in good faith for at least four years, in any of the
following manners: (i) [i]n a law school that is authorized or approved to confer
professional degrees and requires classroom attendance of its students for a
minimum of 270 hours a year; (ii) [i]n a law office in this state and under the
personal supervision of a member of the State Bar of California who is, and for
at least five years last past continuously has been, engaged in the active practice
of law; (iii) [i]n the chambers and under the personal supervision of a judge of a
court of record of this state; (iv) [b]y instruction in law from a correspondence
law school ... requiring 864 hours of preparation and study per year for four
years ... ; (v) [b]y any combination of the [above] methods ....
Id. § 6060(d). In contrast, most states do not allow students of unaccredited schools or
persons under a bar member's tutelage to take the state's bar exam. For example, besides
California, only three states-Vermont, Virginia, and Washington-permit law office study
to substitute for law school. THE LAWYER's ALmANAC 1990, supra note 135, at 237. Only
Massachusetts, New York, and Wyoming permit a combination of education and law office
study to suffice. Id.
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proper motives among legal service providers and consumers. The
market's emphasis on cost could result in lower quality legal services.
One commentator asserts, "[W]here the market fails to provide ad-
equate information about quality, and instead encourages the con-
sumer to choose services for cost alone, suppliers would be pressured
to provide services more cheaply and at a lower quality than would
truly be in the public's interest."''
Of course, individuals may prefer some legal help to none at
all, 5 2 but an individual's financial position should not be the sole
factor determining which level of services she receives.'53 As one com-
mentator asserts, "[T]he resolution of such questions may be far
more important to the poor person or the person of moderate means
than the actual economic value of the case.' ' 5 4 Legal rights cannot
always be measured effectively in economic terms. Critics tradition-
ally have found this to be true for criminal cases and civil rights
cases."' Certain family law, housing, and credit matters such as wel-
fare entitlements, at least, should also be considered with the tra-
ditional cases. The poor person or person of moderate means may
value receiving custody of her children, having her landlord fix the
151. Michelman, supra note 15, at 21 n.75. Michelman argues that since individuals
might often choose to benefit their personal interests over the public interest, the use of a
free market would likely reduce the efficiency and increase the social cost of the adminis-
tration of justice; thus the preservation of the judiciary system is an appropriate aim of
government regulation. Id. at 21. Moreover, Judge Samuel L. Bufford of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court in Los Angeles asserts that "unlicensed legal advisers cause the filing of
enormous numbers of bankruptcy cases that have no business in bankruptcy court." REPORT
I, supra note 12, at 36 (quoting Judge Bufford's written comment).
If Michelman's and Judge Bufford's assertions are that lay practitioners increase the
number of claims brought at the expense of the quality of the claims' presentations (as
addressed in Part III C), then deregulation also could increase the government's financial
burden in operating the courts. During fiscal year 1982, the estimated cost to the federal
government of a tort suit filed in a U.S. District Court was $1740 and in certain tort cases
tried to juries, the average cost was $15,028; the federal government obtains only $60 per
case in filing fees. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808,
1812 (1986) (quoting J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT
EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES xviii, xix (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice 1982); R.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 132 (1985)).
152. "They [the Bar] are protecting people who don't want to be protected . . . . [T]hey
are protecting people who are perfectly willing to take their chances [without a lawyer].
While it is absolutely correct that there is some risk [of getting bad advice,] many of these
are people who have nothing to lose." Sylvester, supra note 2, at 1, 48, col. I (quoting
Alan Morrison of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, a Washington-based public service
group founded by Ralph Nader).
153. B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 15, at 48.
154. Id.
155. Id. See, e.g., Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 UCLA
L. REV. 381, 386-90, 392-97 (1965).
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heater, or getting the government to recalculate her food stamp al-
lotment at a price that would justify the retention of a fully-trained
lawyer, but she may only be able to retain a lay practitioner whose
experience and expertise lies in filling out and filing divorce forms.15 6
The response that this problem exists to some degree right now does
not justify amplifying the problem. And to do so in the name of
helping the poor person and the person of moderate means gain ac-
cess to the law cannot be condoned.
(3) Informational Deficiencies Inherent in the Free Market
Another problem with the free market stems from the difficulty
in attaining correct information or making use of information when
it is available. The market, like the law itself, is complex. People
often are unaware of their need for legal services and the availability
of dependable services. 57 This lack of information is exacerbated by
the fact that many people fear "the law"'"" and the high costs of
acquiring legal help. 59 Most consumers cannot adequately distinguish
156. The 1989 ABA nationwide study, supra note 54, found that the most frequently
mentioned legal problem suffered by consumers was related to medical issues-14.6%. These
issues included problems with access to medical help and medicare and other government
benefits. ABA SrUrDY, supra note 54, at 21-22. Public benefits followed, accounting for
13.4% of the problems. These include problems with food stamps, welfare, and SSD/SSI.
Id. at 22. The remaining rank of problems included: utility-12.2%; family-12%; discrim-
ination-l1.8%; consumer-ll.4%; employment-10%; housing-9.6%; school-4.6% and
other-4.2%. Id. at 21.
157. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual
Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REv. 438, 438 (1965). The General
Accounting Office of the U.S. Comptroller General conducted a survey of 1260 poor persons
eligible for free legal services. Of those interviewed, 60% were not aware that free legal
services were available, and only about half of those who were aware knew the types of
services offered. Report to the Congress, Comptroller General of the U.S. at v (1978). The
ABA Study on legal needs discussed supra also studied low income households' knowledge
of lawyers' services. Those respondents who indicated that they had a civil legal problem
but no lawyer were questioned about the reason: 28.3% thought a lawyer was too expensive;
22.1% believed they could handle the problem themselves; 17.5% did not know how to get
a lawyer; 13.7% thought a lawyer could not help; 6.6% cited "other" reasons; 5.9% used
non-lawyer assistance; and 5.9% asked and were refused service. ABA S=urY, supra note
54, at 33-34. With the benefit of hindsight, however, more than 43% of these same
respondents believed that a lawyer would have made a difference. Id.
158. Many perceive law as being a mysterious force they can neither understand nor
control. See Cheatham, supra note 157, at 438.
159. A limited private survey conducted by James Frierson, a professor at Eastern
Tennessee State University, found that the middle class overestimated lawyers' fees by 91%
for the drafting of a simple will, 123% for a one-half hour consultation and advice session,
and 340% for the reading and giving of advice on an installment contract. Frierson, Legal
Advice, BARRISER 8 (Winter 1985).
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between differences in legal quality and lawyer competence.160 These
problems render the utility of allowing lay practitioners to practice
law without any guidelines dangerous.
These dangers are particularly acute for the poor and persons
of modest means who lack access to legal services. The Connecticut
study on divorce kits showed that the kits "brought no measurable
relief to the area's indigent population."1 61 Instead, the study showed
that the persons who most benefitted from the kits were a small mi-
nority of young and well-educated couples. 162 The problem with these
and other do-it-yourself publications is that the written, generalized
instructions assume threshold levels of education, clerical compe-
tence, and self-confidence that may exceed those of many of the poor
and lower middle class. 163
Even if personalized instructions and advice by lay practitioners
are legalized, it is questionable whether the poor and lower middle
class will fare any better. The difficulty in understanding the written,
generalized instructions, may be alleviated. Allowing lay practition-
ers to provide instructions, however, will not necessarily cure all in-
formational deficiencies. Arguably, the people who will benefit from
the Committee's proposal will be those with the financial means,
cultural familiarity, linguistic facility, education, and self confidence
to gain access to enough information about the various legal services
to determine what their legal needs are and who can best provide for
these needs. 164Realistically, the poor and the lower middle class more
likely lack these resources than other segments of the population.
In sum, the deregulation advocate's free market is premised on
simplicity: supply and demand. Legal services, however, are unlike
products that are freely traded on the market: the consumer of legal
services cannot pick up a sample of a legal service like a piece of fruit
and test it for value. Legal services cannot and should not always
be evaluated by price alone.
C. The Competence Factor: Relevance and Possible Regulation
Another problem with the Committee's proposal is its lack of
competency requirements. Both the Committee and Rhode assert that
160. Michelman, supra note 15, at 21 n.75. Michelman argues that most consumers
cannot adequately distinguish between differences in quality and competence because either
there is a lack of information or consumers cannot make use of such information when
available. Id. at 20 n.74, 21.
161. Project, supra note 72, at 163.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 160-61.
164. Michelman, supra note 15, at 21.
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limited findings of consumer harm do not justify the present re-
gulations of the unauthorized practice of law. 165 Although Rhode
admits that "training equips lawyers with a global perspective not
shared by lay practitioners, and thus may facilitate recognition of
legal issues ancillary to the matter at hand,' 1 66 she discounts the need
for such training for lay practitioners.
Rhode's and the Committee's surveys on the extent of consumer
harm from lay practitioners, however, are unreliable. 167 In particular,
the surveys lack foundation: neither survey uses a sufficiently large
sampling to generate confidence in its results. In Rhode's survey, less
than half of the jurisdictions studied kept records of the complaints
they received. 16 In the Committee's survey, only about one quarter
of the California protection agencies responded. 169 Of the thirty-two
state bars that responded, less than sixty percent kept or could re-
create statistics. 7 0
Rhode suggested that the 2,669 complaints, inquiries, or inves-
tigations concerning lay practitioners received by unauthorized prac-
tice of law officials in 1979 constituted an insubstantial number.17'
This was not inconsequential for California, however: California ac-
counted for more than half of the total number. 72 Rhode herself
admitted that "it is likely that this total significantly underrepre-
sents" the true volume of complaints due to the absence of data from
key states. 173
165. See supra notes 66-74, 96-97 and accompanying text.
166. Rhode, supra note 1, at 88.
167. See Michelman, supra note 15, at 38 (Rhode's research is "confusing and inconclu-
sive").
168. Out of the 45 jurisdictions Rhode used for her analysis, only 22 kept records and
only 12 published information. Rhode, supra note 1, at 21.
169. Of the 126 consumer protection surveys sent, only 31 were returned. REPORT I,
supra note 12, at 5.
170. Of the 54 state bar surveys sent, 32 were returned. Seventeen of the 32 respondents
did not keep statistics on the number of complaints received and only four of those could
provide estimates. This left the Committee with 19 state reports on which to rely. Id. at 5,
40. The Committee concluded that "there are virtually no hard data concerning the subject
matter of our Committee's charge. If there are any significant statistical data, we were
unable to find them. Even our own investigation and surveys did not provide sufficient data
for us to create meaningful statistical analyses." Id. at 7.
171. Rhode, supra note 1, at 22.
172. Id. This could be due to a number of factors: stricter unauthorized practice of law
legislation than in most jurisdictions (although California's laws appear to mirror those of
a majority of states, see supra note 13); stronger unauthorized practice of law enforcement
than in other states (at least for the dates in question); or possibly a larger number of lay
practitioners causing harm.
173. Rhode, supra note 1, at 22 (the excluded jurisdictions are New York, Maryland,
Connecticut, Tennessee, and Washington).
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Problems with Rhode's survey arguably go beyond this. Her
analysis of consumer injury focused on complaints issued directly by
injured clients. 174 This ignores complaints brought by judges, op-
posing lawyers, or lawyers subsequently representing these consum-
ers. 175 No doubt clients themselves also do not report a number of
complaints. 176 Indeed, prior to filing a complaint, a client must dis-
cover that she has been harmed by a lay practitioner in time to rem-
edy the problem. Furthermore, she must have suffered a degree of
harm justifying the time and expense of filing and pursuing a formal
complaint. The client may not even be aware that she can be helped
or know where to go for this help.
A confidence factor also would affect the number of complaints
and inquiries that injured clients bring. Individuals who initially avoid
lawyers, either from a lack of funds, ignorance, or distrust, similarly
may lack confidence to go to lawyers or bar associations to remedy
a problem caused by a lay practitioner. Some individuals, such as
immigrants with possible illegal status, may fear they will be pe-
nalized for reporting to legal officials. 177
Lastly, both Rhode and the Committee surveyed client harm
caused by lay practitioners under circumstances in which the unau-
thorized practice of law rules operated as a deterrent to some extent.
Without such deterrence, consumer harm inevitably would increase
because the number of lay practitioners offering their services would
increase.
Even after an injured consumer discovers her injury and her abil-
ity to redress the injury, and finds an attorney or free legal service
agency to accept her claim (or decides to file pro se), she still must
bring a successful claim. If a lay practitioner actually misrepresents
herself as a licensed attorney, the consumer can sue under the tra-
ditional tort theory of misrepresentation. 78 Arguably, however, prac-
titioners that misrepresent themselves often will be those who either
174. Id. at 33.
175. See Michelman, supra note 15, at 39.
176. Michelman also shares this view; she asserts that injuries may not get reported to
bar officials because:
cases involving the most obvious types of harm to the consumer are probably the
least likely to go to trial or be appealed. Furthermore, to the extent that the courts
may presume the existence of harm without requiring actual proof, the parties
may have no incentive to litigate this issue.
Id. at 38.
177. Id. at 39; Rhode, supra note 1, at 32-33.
178. See McKay v. Longsworth, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1592, 260 Cal. Rptr. 250 (reh'g denied
1989) (upholding tort damages resulting from a suit against the plaintiff by a lay practitioner
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer).
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lack the financial resources to remedy their wrongs or simply will
take flight before they are brought to justice. 79 If the consumer
knowingly hires a lay practitioner and thus is not deceived by the
practitioner's status, she will have to sue under a contract1 80 or tort
theory of malpractice. Since the consumer often may not have a con-
tract with the lay practitioner, however, the contract option often
will be closed. The malpractice theory also has proven an unreliable
source of relief for injured consumers.' 8' Early cases refused to hold
a lay practitioner liable for damages absent privity of contract.812
Biankanja v. Irving'8 3 was the first case to allow damages based on
negligence. In Biakanja, the court disapproved of the earlier cases
requiring a contract-based claim and held that whether a lay prac-
titioner would be held liable to a third person was a question of pub-
lic policy.'" The court balanced a number of factors:
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plain-
tiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of pre-
venting future harm.' 5
Ten years later in Bland v. Reed,8 6 however, the court refused to
hold a lay practitioner to a duty of care absent a contract for services
implying any warranty; the court stated that the negligent nonper-
formance of an obligation voluntarily assumed did not give rise to
a duty. 8 7 Thus, because of the difficulties in initiating and success-
fully winning a trial, a consumer needs additional protection to en-
179. See REPORT I, supra note 12, at 35, 37, for examples of this occurrence.
180. See In Re Anderson, 79 Bankr. 482 (S.D. Cal. 1987). In rescinding and restituting
all monies paid under a contract between the defendant paralegal service and the plaintiff
for bankruptcy services, the court relied on "California law [which] has long held that a
contract executed in violation of a statute which requires one of the parties to be licensed
will not be enforced." Id. at 485.
181. As a general rule, the entrustment of a legal problem to a lay practitioner effectively
prevents the consumer from maintaining a civil remedy for malpractice. Michelman, supra
note 15, at 17-18. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 94-95, for the assertion that a malpractice
suit presently is an unsuitable response to pervasive incompetence or misfeasance.
182. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 342-43, 42 P. 900, 900 (1895); Mickel v. Murphy,
147 Cal. App. 2d 718, 721-22, 305 P.2d 993, 995-96 (1957) ("disapproved" in Biakanja v.
Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 728, 320 P.2d 16 (1958)).
183. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
184. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
185. Id.
186. 261 Cal. App. 2d 445, 67 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1968).
187. Id. at 450-51, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63. Here the defendant did not represent that
he was an attorney; he merely gave legal advice to the plaintiff. Id. at 448-49, 67 Cal. Rptr.
at 861.
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sure that injury will not occur or that if it does occur, it will have
a greater likelihood of being remedied than it has presently.'
D. The Danger that Lay Practitioners May Be Used as an Excuse To
Curtail or Abolish Free Legal Services
Because deregulation may not benefit the middle class and may
even harm the poor, the biggest danger presented by deregulation is
that the existence of lay practitioners may be used as an excuse for
further cuts in free legal services to indigents. 18 9 This danger is far
from imagined. In fact, William C. Durant III, former chairman of
Legal Services Corporation, advocated deregulating the legal pro-
fession in connection with dismantling Legal Services. 190 He argued
that deregulation would create a utopia of "shared vision," which
would "unleash the tremendous energies of a free and creative people
to bring about an open and competitive system of resolving disputes
and providing access to justice for all people."' 9' Durant likened the
results of the deregulation of legal services to the results created by
the "[d]eregulation in the trucking, airline and railroad industries
... all [of which] reflect this positive development for consum-
ers.' ' 92 Time has shown, however, that the harm from deregulating
188. Cf. Note, supra note 1, at 1543-44 (arguing that although problems of consumer
information exist because many clients are unable to ascertain the nature and acuity of their
problems without experts, legal problems outside the criminal cases do not cause fatal or
irreparable harm and the malpractice system provides adequate protection against legal
incompetence).
189. See Michelman, supra note 15, at 21 n.76 ("[d]eregulation could be used as an
excuse to force the poor, who have no choice as to quality, either to rely on the lowest
quality services available in that market, or to forego any services at all").
190. Durant: Let's Help the Poor by Abolishing LSC, Legal Times, Feb. 23, 1987, at
17, col. 1 (excerpts from speech given at the ABA mid-year meeting in New Orleans in Feb.
1987) [hereinafter Durant]. Durant, a Reagan appointee, presumably shared at least part of
Reagan's vision of abolishing government aid for legal services. See e.g., R. BROWNSTEIN
& N. EASTON, supra note 56, at 425 (noting that Reagan frequently appointed as head of
an agency someone who opposed the agency's purpose; Legal Services was no exception);
Thomas, supra note 127, at 2, col. 4 (asserting that Durant's proposal "is a cover for
destroying the Legal Services Corporation"). The concerns regarding Legal Services Cor-
poration defunding have not ceased with the expiration of President Reagan's term of office.
On the contrary, the combination of President Bush's conservative viewpoint on welfare
funding and the weak state of the economy keeps the issue very relevant. See, e.g., Barr,
Doers and Talkers, THE AM. LAW., July 1990, at 51 (George Wittgraf, an attorney appointed
by President Bush to chair Legal Services Corporation, recognizes that Legal Services
Corporation is insufficiently funded but foresees only "modest increases" in the Legal
Services Corporation budget under the President's stewardship).
191. Durant, supra note 190, at 17, col. 2.
192. Id. at 17, col. 4.
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industries such as the airlines and the banks has outweighed the ben-
efits. 193
If free legal services for civil claims were further deregulated or
even abolished, forcing the poor to use a different and arguably less
competent source of legal help than that available to persons with
financial means, the Constitution's equal protection and due process
clauses may be implicated. 194 Technically, if both the rich and the
poor are required to pay the cost of attorney's fees, there is no overt
discrimination violating equal protection. An equal protection ar-
gument would have to stand on disproportionate impact alone. The
courts, however, have not been willing to use heightened equal pro-
tection review based solely on disproportionate impact.195 Most com-
mentators predict that the courts will not recognize an equal protection
claim to abolish all wealth discrimination regarding civil claims. 96
Due process may provide a more successful argument. One com-
mentator has argued, "[I]n civil cases when expert testimony or con-
sultation is critical to a successful outcome, the fundamental fairness
query of due process analysis requires that indigents be given the
193. A study by the Economic Policy Institute, a Washington research center, has shown
that airline deregulation actually has resulted in higher air fares and poorer service. Ramos,
Airline Deregulation Rapped, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 29, 1990, at D4. See also Lovett,
Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1365, 1376-77 (1989) (asserting that one reason for the U.S. banking failures was the Reagan
Administration's relaxation of banking regulation); Wiley, Patrick, Tisch, Blake & Breger,
Broadcast Deregulation: The Reagan Years and Beyond, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 345, 347 (1988)
(noting the skepticism surrounding the benefits of air transportation and rail deregulation
that occurred during the Reagan years). For further information on bank risks, failures,
and regulatory strategies, see 0. BENSTON, R. EISENBEIS, D. HoRviTz, E. KANE & G.
KAUFMAN, PERSPEacVEs ON SAFE & SOUND BANKING 28-33, 175-77, 245-71 (1986).
194. Professor Lawrence Tribe has argued that there should be a "right of judicial
access," including the right to an attorney, woven from strands of doctrine based upon
equal protection, procedural due process, and the first amendment rights of speech and
petition, supported by the ninth amendment. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 10-18, at 759 (2d ed. 1988). Another commentator has advanced, and ultimately rejected,
the argument that the first amendment's right to petition the judiciary provides support for
an indigent's right to expert assistance in civil trials. This argument can be extended to
apply to the right to an attorney. See Medine, Expert Assistance in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 281, 284 n.12 (1990) ("the first amendment provides only a right to access, not to
assistance in taking advantage of that access").
195. See e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-
66 (1977) (disproportionate impact, standing alone, is not enough to trigger heightened equal
protection review, even in the context of race). Even in criminal cases, the courts have been
unwilling to rely on equal protection. In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, asserted that the state's duty "is not to duplicate the
legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant." Id. at 616.
196. See, e.g., Medine, supra note 194, at 298-303 (arguing that equal protection
principles will not justify a right to expert assistance for poor persons).
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opportunity to obtain expert assistance." 197 This argument essentially
involves the payment of funds to third parties to assist in presenting
claims. In that sense, an attorney is analogous to the expert witness
and the right to an attorney in the same circumstances then follows.19
Commentators aside, however, the Supreme Court has "demon-
strated hostility to the appointment of counsel for indigent civil lit-
igants." 199
Deregulation thus has the added danger of providing an excuse
to curtail funds for free legal services that will not be alleviated by
the courts. Although deregulation seeks to increase the access of the
poor and middle class to legal services, it actually may curtail access.
The Bar, therefore, as the avowed protector of the public, 200 must
ensure that its final proposal will not be used as a means of abol-
ishing free legal services.20 1
197. Id. at 303.
198. The suggestion that indigents should have a right to appointed counsel in civil cases
is not novel. Other countries have allowed for this statutorily and constitutionally. See e.g.,
R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 276 (3d ed. 1970) ("Most civil law countries have long
recognized Legal Aid as a public function to be regulated by law. Statutory schemes ...
make sure that in civil as well as criminal litigation an indigent party will be represented
by competent counsel."); O'Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss
Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1967) (the Swiss Constitution guarantees the right to
counsel in civil cases); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J.
545, 551 (1967) (free legal counsel for the poor is provided by most industrial nations).
199. Medine, supra note 194, at 319; see e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv.,
452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (using a rebuttable presumption against the right to counsel in civil
cases when no loss of liberty would result, the Court held that the plaintiff's rights were
not violated by a state's proceeding terminating her parental rights in which she had no
counsel). Since Lassiter, state courts have had an opportunity to review the constitutional
right to appointment of counsel in civil cases. When a fundamental deprivation of liberty
is threatened in civil proceedings such as civil contempt, commitment, paternity, and
termination of parental rights proceedings, some courts have held there is a right to counsel.
See e.g., Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 602-04 (5th Cir.) (right to counsel in termination of
parental rights cases), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052 (1981); McKinstry v. Genesee County
Circuit Judges, 669 F. Supp. 801, 804 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (right to counsel in civil contempt
proceeding based on Lassiter); Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 31-34, 593 P.2d 226, 231-
34, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533, 535-37 (1979) (right to counsel in paternity proceedings when
the state is an adversary or the mother is represented by the state); State ex rel. Cody v.
Toner, 8 Ohio St. 3d 22, 24, 456 N.E.2d 813, 814-15 (1983) (right to counsel in paternity
proceedings based on federal and state due process clauses); see also Note, The Indigent
Defendant's Right to Court-Appointed Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceedings for Nonpay-
ment of Child Support, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 326 (1983) (right to counsel in child support
cases) (authored by Robert Monk). The recognition by state courts of a right to counsel in
civil cases when a fundamental deprivation of liberty is threatened would provide some
protection to indigent litigants. But this right seems to be far from well-recognized, a fact
that should be the source of discomfort to the state legislature that deregulates the practice
of law without providing a correlative alternative access to legal help through increased
funding of free legal service organizations.
200. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
201. While this Part has stressed the personal effect of abolishing free legal services to
V. Licensure as a Better Alternative to Deregulation
A minimum-level licensing scheme is the best method to remedy
lack of access to and control over the legal system while still ensuring
that individuals, especially those with limited financial resources, and
the judicial system are not harmed. 2 2 Under this scheme, individuals
who have obtained a minimum level of efficiency would be permitted
to practice in areas that have been predetermined to be standardized
and not to require a high level of legal skill to perform. These in-
dividuals would be required to register with a state agency and would
be bound by the same ethics standards as attorneys.
Although this licensing plan would not affect supply and price
to the extent that full deregulation would, this plan has the benefit
of ensuring some protection from incompetence and fraud. The due
process and equal protection issues may not be implicated and in-
formational difficulties will not be as problematic once the consu-
mer's choice becomes less crucial-once the consumer can be
somewhat assured that the practitioner she hires is at least competent.
As one commentator has explained, "licensure's approach to infor-
indigents, society too will be affected negatively. This is true not only because unresolved
legal problems potentially can hinder an individual's contribution (in all senses of the word)
to society, but also because society needs to believe somehow that the law is or at least
strives to be freely accessible and fairly applied to all. Further, many Legal Service cases,
such as civil rights class action suits, have precedential value and potentially can affect a
large number of individuals. See Cramton, supra note 24, at 553-54. Cf. R. BROWNSTEIN &
N. EASTON, supra note 56, at 429 (citing comment by Howard Phillips, then national director
of the Conservative Caucus:
Whatever the issue, be it OSHA, busing, transsexual benefits claims, election law,
expunging arrest records, private school, conscription, and even national defense,
the poverty lawyers are being subsidized at public expense to propagate their
private views of what is good for the poor and what is good for the country.)
The California Legislature recognizes that the resolution of an individual's legal problems
can impact society: "the expansion, improvement, and initiation of legal services to indigent
persons will aid in the advancement of the science of jurisprudence and the improvement
of the administration of justice." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6210 (West 1990).
202. Milton Friedman describes three levels of occupational control. The most restrictive
form, licensing, is:
an arrangement under which one must obtain a license from a recognized authority
in order to engage in the occupation. The license is more than a formality. It
requires some demonstration of competence or the meeting of some tests ostensibly
designed to ensure competence, and anyone who does not have a license is not
authorized to practice and is subject to a fine or jail sentence if he does engage
in practice.
M. FRmDMAN, CAPrrAMisM AND FREEDOM 144-45 (1962). Certification, the mid-ground, allows
one to hold oneself out as possessing certain skills and may, but need not necessarily,
restrict practice to those certified as possessing those skills. Id. The least restrictive form,
registration, involves only an official listing of the names of all practitioners. Id.
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mation problems is to structure consumer choices so that even if con-
sumers do not fully understand what they are buying, they can feel
safe from the prospect of being led through ignorance to purchase
services of a quality so poor as to compromise their interests. 203
Although Rhode persuasively suggests that freedom to choose in it-
self justifies full deregulation, 2°4 freedom to choose only is beneficial
if the choices are not illusory. A limited licensing scheme that re-
stricts lay practitioners to certain areas in which they have shown an
aptitude would help remedy the problem of lay practitioners' inten-
tionally or unintentionally handling a legal problem they are inca-
pable of handling. Thus an individual who requires services that have
been deemed capable of being handled by a nonlawyer can choose
between a full-fledged lawyer or a lay practitioner.
A. Appropriate Areas in Which Lay Practitioners May Operate
Licensure of lay practitioners would be appropriate in certain
areas in which the legal claim does not require a lawyer's high level
of expertise. One commentator analyzed the standardization of legal
services and found that "there is reason to believe that standardized
or standardizable legal services form a large portion of the practice
of many lawyers. ' 20 5 He cites as the most standardizable areas of
law: uncontested divorces, preparation of wills and trusts, prepa-
ration of income tax returns, probate services, and certain real estate
matters. The next level of standardizable areas are: uncontested
adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, collections, changes of
name, and incorporations of small businesses. 2° Because these types
203. Note, supra note 1, at 1542; see also Michelman, supra note 15, at 14 (lack of
information and inability to make use of available information is partially alleviated by
licensing).
204. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
205. Engel, supra note 9, at 842-43.
206. Id. at 842. Engel examined five factors to determine which services are standardized
and standardizable, including: the use of fixed fee rates, the delegation of work by lawyers
to lay assistants, the use of automation and computer technology, the application of systems
analysis techniques, and the extent of encroachment by lay practitioners in that area. Id. at
822-41.
For specific areas of standardization, see Project, supra note 72, at 140 ("Clearly,
professional expertise is not a prerequisite for the completion of dissolution forms. Discretion
in form selection and preparation is minimal, and errors are either readily correctable [sic]
or inconsequential."); Lancaster, Rating Lawyers: If Your Legal Problems are Complex, a
Clinic May Not be the Answer, Wall St. J., July 31, 1980, at 1, col. 1 (asserting that
attorneys in California rarely participate in residential real estate sales because retaining
counsel may be tantamount to "hir[ing] a surgeon to pierce an ear") (quoting Robert
Ellickson, a law professor specializing in real property, regarding the use of a major Los
Angeles law firm for a home sale).
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of law require less legal expertise, lay practitioners may competently
perform them.2°7 Borrowing from one commentator's analogy, doc-
tors and dentists, like lawyers, cost too much; and while no one sug-
gests letting an untrained person operate, lay people, under the
supervision of registered nurses, instead of licensed opthalmologists
and otolaryngolists, regularly screen school children for vision and
hearing defects. 208
The Commission has been charged with ascertaining the areas
of practice and scope of tasks that lay practitioners may perform. 20 9
Its findings can be used to effectuate a licensing program. 210 The
Commission's determination should be subject to evolution: future
advancements in law may justify extending the areas in which lay
practice is allowable and, alternatively, complexities may arise that
warrant curbing those areas. The agency set up to regulate the lay
practitioners should designate a committee to be responsible for per-
forming a continuing study of the areas of law that can be added
and dropped from the licensing program.
B. Competence Requirements
Competence requiremenfts must be balanced carefully-compe-
tence on one side, the price of acquiring competence on the other.
Competency can be ensured by requiring either the attainment of a
certain level of education or the passage of a rudimentary exami-
nation testing the area or areas in which the lay practitioner wishes
to practice. Educational requirements should encompass a variety of
learning resources, including paralegal schools and apprenticeships.
Awareness of the various standardized legal forms needed for the
practitioner's specialty and how to prepare these forms should be
emphasized. The certificate issued to a lay practitioner should specify
the area or areas in which the lay practitioner is proficient to practice.
A lay practitioner's certification in specific areas would define her
207. Standardized or routine services form "a large portion of the practice of many
lawyers." Engel, supra note 9, at 842-43.
208. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 15, at 52.
209. See Resolution, supra note 113. Due to time constraints, the Commission limited
its study to the same four areas that the Committee studied: bankruptcy, family law,
immigration, and landlord-tenant law. REPORT II, supra note 12, at 9.
210. The Commission proposed licensing lay practitioners in bankruptcy, family law,
and landlord-tenant law. REPORT II, supra note 12, at 1. See id. at 19-25 for a condensed
version of the Commission's conclusions on each area of law, and Report II Exhibits 7-10,
(available at the California State Bar Office of Professional Standards), for the full reports
in each division.
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competence and there would be no guarantees of competence beyond
these specific areas.
C. Ethical Constraints on Lay Practitioners
Under this proposed licensing plan, lay practitioners would be
subject to the same ethical constraints as attorneys. 21 Other pro-
fessional groups are already under this type of ethical licensing re-
straint, including groups as diverse as accountants and
cosmetologists. 2 2 An important ethical restraint should be the pro-
hibition on accepting or retaining a case that the practitioner de-
termines she cannot handle competently; a similar restriction presently
binds attorneys. 213 Registered lay practitioners also should be granted
client confidentiality privileges similar to those held by attorneys.
D. Prophylactic and Remedial Measures
Waiver requirements, 214 as suggested by the Committee, 215 can
provide additional prophylactic relief beyond the competency and
ethics standards. Without such a waiver, licensing could mislead con-
sumers to believe that the Bar or licensing agency is representing the
equality of lay practitioners and licensed lawyers because of the Bar's
history of tight regulation of the practice of law. Each practitioner
would be required to obtain a signed consent form from each client
acknowledging that the client knows the practitioner is not a licensed
attorney of the California Bar. Considering the extent of abuses found
to have been made by immigration specialists and notaries, 2 6 waivers
should be written in the native language of the client. The consent
211. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 94 for this suggestion.
212. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5081 (West 1990) (accountants); id. § 7332
(cosmetologists). Furthermore, a licensing board may deny a license to a person convicted
of a crime or deemed to have committed an act involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit with
the intent of substantially benefitting herself or injuring another. Id. § 480.
213. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-110(B) (1989).
214. Rhode, supra note 1, at 95 ("Although the effectiveness of disclosure regulation
has varied in different commercial and professional contexts, there is some basis for believing
that intelligibly drafted statements can facilitate informed consumer choice"); see also
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) (analyzing the effect on lawyers and desirability of the use
of an informed consent doctrine and concluding that this would facilitate and encourage
dialogue between lawyers and clients). But see Michelman, supra note 15, at 24 ("[Mlandatory
disclosure of risks is a weak way of protecting the public .... It assumes that people will
understand disclosed information and will use it to make an appropriate calculation of their
interests.").
215. REPORT I, supra note 12, at 11.
216. See supra note 91.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
LAY PRACTITIONERS
form should include the lay practitioner's license identification num-
ber and the area or areas of practice in which she is licensed to per-
form. The licensing agency should keep public registration records
on lay practitioners that state the areas of law in which they are al-
lowed to practice and any complaints, disciplinary actions, or court
convictions brought against them. The registration and continuous
update of each practitioner's name and address will shorten the of-
ficial response time for locating a possibly errant practitioner and
will help prevent the responsible party from disappearing.
Consumers harmed by licensed lay practitioners should not be
forced to rely on contract law or on the tort of misrepresentation,
but should be able to sue for malpractice. The same standard of care
presently imposed on attorneys217 also should be imposed on lay prac-
titioners.218
Another protective measure that will ensure to some extent the
continuing competence of lay practitioners is mandatory continuing
education.21 9 The California Legislature recently enacted a require-
ment that the Bar request the California Supreme Court to adopt a
rule of court authorizing the Bar to establish and administer a man-
datory continuing education program for members of the Bar. 220 Like
the Bar's continuing education, 221 the program for lay practitioners
should require that some of the educational requirements include
ethics training.
As a final further protective measure, part of the licensing fee
paid by lay practitioners should be put into a client fund similar to
that presently reserved by the Bar for clients who are harmed by
attorneys. 2 2 When a client is injured by a lay practitioner who cannot
217. Rule 1.1 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT establishes certain guide-
lines on lawyer competence; competence is "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1989). Michelman defines competence as a "set of qualities shared by
lawyers of relatively similar backgrounds." Michelman, supra note 15, at 16.
218. Michelman, supra note 15, at 15-19.
219. Michelman also suggests requiring mandatory continuing education or submission
to periodic license review. Id. at 18-19 & n.70. See generally, Garth, Rethinking the Legal
Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer
Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 639 (criticizing the bar's obsession with competence).
220. CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 6070(a) (West 1990). This rule must require that within
designated 36-month periods, all active members must complete at least 36 hours of legal
education approved by the Bar or offered by a Bar-approved provider. Id.
221. Eight of these hours must be in legal ethics or law practice management with at
least four hours devoted to ethics. Id.
222. The client security fund was created in 1972. It may pay clients up to $50,000 for
losses due to an attorney's dishonest conduct. From its creation to July 31, 1981, the fund
paid more than $1,270,000 in 302 cases. News Background, supra note 19, at 9-10. California
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or will not pay the damage award either because of financial inability
or because she cannot be brought to court, the court may allow the
client's damage award to be paid out of the fund.
E. The Proper Agency to Regulate and Police Lay Practitioners
Another issue to resolve is to whom the task of registering and
policing lay practitioners should be entrusted. The Bar and the public
could be joined together, as is done with other licensed groups. 223
Placing this responsibility in the hands of the Bar would efficiently
utilize the persons who arguably have the most expertise in the legal
field and who already have a system to regulate the practice of law.
It would, however, only partially assuage those who feel that the Bar
has a strangle-hold on the legal profession. The alternative that would
best quell the public's fears and distrust of the Bar would be com-
bining a consumer protection agency and a prosecutorial agency. 224
The agency's governing board should equally comprise members of
the Bar, licensed lay practitioners, and other members of the public
not licensed as lay practitioners or lawyers.
225
(1) Powers of the Agency
The agency charged with supervising lay practice should have
certain discretionary powers. According to the Committee's pro-
posal, a lay practitioner's past violations of the law would not affect
her registration status; in fact, the Committee does not give the agency
any power to refuse to grant or to revoke a registration certificate.
A better approach would be to allow the agency to use its discretion
in denying and revoking a lay practitioner's license. Although the
standard need not be as general as the "good moral character" re-
quired of Bar members, 226 the agency should at least be able to deny
or revoke a lay practitioner's license in response to an ethical vio-
lation of the Act or other law, persistent client complaints, or find-
State Bar members are required to pay $25 above the usual membership fee to this fund
each year. STATE BAR OF CAL., ANALYSIS OF THE 1988 STATE BAR Assoc. BUDGET 17 (June
1987).
223. For example, the board regulating cosmetologists is made up of seven persons,
three of whom are registered cosmetologists and four of whom are members of the general
public. CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 7301 (West 1990).
224. The Commission opted to place the control in the hands of the Department of
Consumer Affairs. REPORT II, supra note 12, at 28.
225. In contrast, the Commission recommended that the board comprise one member of
the Bar, two licensed lay practitioners, and four public members. Id. at 29.
226. See supra note 19.
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ings of negligence. The agency also must be empowered with the right
to compel a lay person to return files and other work product to the
client.
The agency should be required to ensure that lay practitioners
only advertise and perform activities they are licensed to provide. A
record of a lay practitioner's conviction of any law or customer com-
plaint should be filed with the practitioner's licensing statistics so that
a potential customer will have a chance, at least, to discover any prior
wrongdoing of the lay practitioner.
The chosen agency must be willing to create and enforce policy
goals and rules. Even those commentators who believe that regulating
the unauthorized practice of law is valid and essential agree that the
bars and courts of each jurisdiction need to clarify the laws and reg-
ulate them more consistently. 227 Lay practitioners who wish to prac-
tice law must know the exact limits within which they must work.
(2) Bar Involvement in the Agency's Regulatory Activities
There are a number of ways the Bar can expedite this licensing
system without imposing on the agency in charge. The Bar could
assist the agency while still maintaining a "showing of neutrality"
by allowing the state lawyer referral services to recommend licensed
lay practitioners to consumers. 228 The Bar also could publish pam-
phlets informing consumers which legal services are more likely to
be effectively performed by technicians. 229
Regarding its own regulatory structure, the Bar should continue
its effort to simplify legal processes when possible. 20 Most impor-
tantly, the Bar should maintain an active policy of encouraging vol-
untary pro bono work by Bar members.
227. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HoPsoN, supra note 18, at 173, 189-91; Michelman, supra note
15, at 4-6.
228. In 1956, the Bar created certified referral services that permitted persons to rec-
ommend lawyers who fulfilled certain standards determined by the Bar. News Background,
supra note 19, at 13.
229. Michelman, supra note 15, at 58 (proposing that the bar publish guides rating self-
help publications and listing standards of competence for lay practitioners, as well as
expanding the present scope of its own self-help publications). The Bar presently engages
in a news-media relations and pamphlet program. In 1981, the Bar distributed approximately
one million free pamphlets on consumer rights, the law, and the legal system. News
Background, supra note 19, at 17-18.
230. Project, supra note 72, at 164-65 (suggesting a simplification of the uncontested
divorce process). The California Legislature has embraced this policy at least with respect
to wills. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6240-6241 (West Supp. 1990) (providing a form will, both
with and without trust provisions).
November 1990]
248 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
Conclusion
Moderation is the key to resolving this crisis. On the one hand,
present unauthorized practice of law rules are partially untenable and
foster distrust of the legal profession. On the other hand, full de-
regulation is an idealistic approach that could cause more harm than
good. If the poor or people of moderate means must choose between
no help and incompetent help, they have no choice at all. The Cal-
ifornia Bar should allow lay practitioners to provide those particular
legal services that can be provided by persons less qualified than fully-
trained lawyers at possibly lower costs. Licensing lay practitioners
in certain standardizable areas and holding them accountable for cer-
tain competence and ethic standards provides a safe answer to the
present lack of access to civil legal assistance.
